In August, 1953, CTG 7.3 recommended to CINCPACFLT that the
then planned security forces--l1 VP squadron (12 P2V-6's), 4 DDE's,
and 4 F4LU-5N's—-be augmented in order to execute more fully the
security mission.
It was pointed out that the danger area for IVY
was only sixty per cent of that prescribed for CASTLE and that only
a slight augmentation would assure a significant increase in the
capability to successfully support the security mission.
CTG 7.3
recommended the assignment of an additional Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW) ship (DDE or smaller) to assist at Bikini, unless the Eniwetok
Underwater Detection Unit could be enlarged for that purpose.
In
addition, an increase in F4U's from four to six was proposed.
CINCPACFLT assigned two additional fighter aircraft and indicated
that a PC would be assigned for use as an additional ASW vessel;
but the cost for the installation of a hydrophone system at Bikini
was determined to be prohibitive.
Amphibious ship beachings constituted a knotty Task Group 7.3
problem.
The LST operating between Eniwetok and Bikini played an
important role in support of the CASTLE logistical mission but was
severely hampered on many occasiors in doing so by the inadequate
beaching conditions at Bikini.
A channel to the pier had been
blasted out of the coral bottom creating a narrow trough which allowed only about ten yards clearance to the starboard of a beached
LST.
Before each beaching it was necessary for H&N to remove large
amounts of sand from the channel to providethe proper beaching
gradient.
To alleviate the undesirable situation, H&N widened the
ehannel to about
150 feet.
This had an unexpected detrimental