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approximate yield of some of the devices at Operation REDWING.
Mr. Fields said that it might be possible, within the terms
of the present declassification guide,
to state to the press
observers a range for the yield of the detonation they would
witness.
Mr.
Libby pointed out that the yield of devices
detonated on the ground could be calculated easily and observed
that since the information would be compromised it would not
be necessary to keep these yields highly classified.
However,
me said the yield of air buvsts shoutd not be cisclosed since
this might compromise sensitive information.
The Commissioners
and General Manager then discussed at length the sensitivity
and exvent of knowledge about thormonucles> weapons developments
in bovn the U.S. and U.S.¢-R. and the compsrative level of
achievement in the field.
During this discussion the following
points were made:
a. Mr. Libby said he believed it was necessary
co be cautious about releasing informatior on
chermonuclear weapons because of the need to
protect certain principles used by the U.S. in these
weapons.
He referred to the Cormission's decision not
oO Join with the DOD in determing that thermonuclear
weapons information could be transmitted to the U.K.
b. Mr. Vance said he believed that eventually the
information would have to be provided che U.K.
Yrecause of the DOD desire to be able to invsegratve
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