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No.

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UNITED STATES  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
Washington 25, D. C.

March 30, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSIONERS AND GENERAL MANAGER

Subject: AGENDA PLANNING SESSION, 11:00 a.m., Friday, March 30, 1956

At 11:00 a.m., on Friday March 30, 1956 the Agenda Planning Session was held in the Chairman's office. Those present were:

- W. F. Libby
- Harold S. Vance
- K. E. Fields
- William Mitchell
- W. B. McCool
- William L. Oakley
- Manuel Dupkin, Jr.

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
The following is a report of the subjects discussed:

1. Location of IAEA Headquarters

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Mr. Libby said that the Department of State was now considering possible locations for the International Atomic Energy Agency headquarters. He said he believed that the Commission should take the position that the headquarters should be in New York City and suggested that the Commission consider the matter at the meeting scheduled for April 4.

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2. MURA Negotiations.

Mr. Libby said that Mr. Hovde had informed him earlier in the day that MURA was prepared to begin negotiations for the construction of the midwestern accelerator and said that he had asked Mr. Hovde to speak to the General Manager. He suggested that the General Manager negotiate with the group and that he refer only policy matters concerning the negotiations to the Commission.

3. Personnel for AEC Reactor Safeguard Organization

Mr. Fields reported that Mr. Clifford Beck would join AEC shortly to participate in the establishment of AEC functions concerning reactor safeguards. He added that he would also speak to Mr. Rogers McCullough concerning the possibility of his accepting a similar position with AEC.

4. Apparent Disclosures of Privileged and Classified Information

Mr. Libby referred to the frequent apparent disclosures of privileged and classified information, and specifically to a recent leak concerning a personnel security case. He said that he had discussed the matter with Mr. Traynor and suggested as a possible means of deducing the responsible persons, that all such instances be recorded in order to establish, if possible, a pattern which would indicate the responsible



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parties. Mr. Libby said he believed that the responsible parties should be vigorously prosecuted. Mr. Fields said he agreed and that he would ask Mr. Nelson to intensify efforts to determine the identities of those responsible.

5. Agenda.

The Commission discussed their schedules during the following weeks, and approved the agenda for the week of April 2.

With reference to the proposed paper on a Special Reactor Test Site, Mr. Libby suggested that Mr. Murphree be asked for his opinion on the importance of the nuclear propulsion for rockets programs.

Mr. Libby referred to the possibility that appropriations hearings would be held during the latter part of April or the first part of May and to the absence, during this period, of Mr. Strauss and Mr. Vance. He observed that it was vital that the remaining Commissioners be available during this period because of the possible need for them to testify on the AEC FY 1957 budget.

Mr. Fields reported that letters to the press on the observer program for Operation REDWING would be dispatched on Monday. Mr. Libby referred to the discussion at the meeting the previous day concerning the possible need to declassify the



approximate yield of some of the devices at Operation REDWING. Mr. Fields said that it might be possible, within the terms of the present declassification guide, to state to the press observers a range for the yield of the detonation they would witness. Mr. Libby pointed out that the yield of devices detonated on the ground could be calculated easily and observed that since the information would be compromised it would not be necessary to keep these yields highly classified. However, he said the yield of air bursts should not be disclosed since this might compromise sensitive information. The Commissioners and General Manager then discussed at length the sensitivity and extent of knowledge about thermonuclear weapons developments in both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and the comparative level of achievement in the field. During this discussion the following points were made:

a. Mr. Libby said he believed it was necessary to be cautious about releasing information on thermonuclear weapons because of the need to protect certain principles used by the U.S. in these weapons. He referred to the Commission's decision not to join with the DOD in determining that thermonuclear weapons information could be transmitted to the U.K.

b. Mr. Vance said he believed that eventually the information would have to be provided the U.K. because of the DOD desire to be able to integrate



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U.S., U.K. and Canadian military forces in the event of war. He pointed out that the MLC had indicated that the DOD would seek legislation to do so.

c. Mr. Fields said that from intelligence information on the latest Soviet tests, it appeared that they were already using certain of the principles the Commission regarded as being highly sensitive. He observed that after Operation CASTLE, certain information on the U.S. developments had probably been compromised through the cancellation research on means of using deuterium.

W. B. McCool  
Secretary

cc: General Counsel

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