IV. Cece TAres — 1G
Nie 74
As is described earlier, the atmospheric operation planned for early 1962
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was set in motion by the president's decision that the mkkkkaxx Department
of Defense and AEC should prepare for an operation that might begin as early
as February or March 1962.
Basis for the president's decision rested with
the effects test pleaded for by the DOD to investigate those phenomena that
had to do with the ABM problem, that is, with high altitude detonations while
the AEC wished to do a number of large yield nuclear tests in the atmosphere
and various branches of the armed forces wished to do some systems tests.
IT
was the high altitude tests that actually led to the decision to return to
atmospheric testing or to prepare for atmospheric testing.
As long as those
tests were to be conducted, then the AEC experiments and the DOD systems tests
could also be allowed. Two planning limits were placed on the operation: one,
fission
the total amount of/yield to be allowed, a number that was actually not settled
for some time eran(wi |
duration of the operation.
have to look up the actual
number) and scone the
The duration of the operation was to aoeby
the time necessary to conduct a high altitude portion of the operation and
other tests would be allowed within that window.
~y
After initial discussions
go
with the proponents of various high altitude carrier systems and with the
experimental agencies that had to carry out the measurements,
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it appeared that ©
the high altitude portions could be ready for a first certification shot in
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April or May of 1962.
These debates had gone on in the period before October fF. 2.%
1961.
!tet's say that it would take approximately six months
So, in essence,
to get ready for the first high altitude calibration shot.
Teak and Orange of
1958 had shown us that Johnston
high altitude
appropriate site for such/detonations.
PF yt
The experience of go “ ay
Island was probably the
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The 1958 high altitude detonations
had been moved from Bikini Ato! to Johnston Island during the operation when
it was recognized that the hazard of eye, burn and hence blinding was too large
okHe ae.
to accept with the great number of maesir~teaves- natives that might view the shot.
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