should always control the communication center which seines it.
19.
@erience
in this operation indi~ted the impossibility
of operating a supply depot large enough to supply the unprogrammed
needs of the entire task force for communication-elect~nics equipment.
Attempts to perform this function led to an intolerable
situation wherein excesses existed of unwanted items, and real requircments were not met.
20. The arrangements under which part of the equipment in the
Joint Communication Facilities was provided by and accounted for by
the Air Force and part by the Army led to a real difficulty in coordinating maintenance support and replacement factors~
21. Considerable and expensive the was lost during the interim
and byild-up stages by persomel travel to and from weather island
sites via KWAJA131N where the only available amphibious type aircraft were based~
22.
The TG 7.2 Transportation Officer as Deputy Port Commander
acted as the NSTS representative for ships entering the ENIWETOK ?ort.
The authority for actions taken, however, were rmt defined in available directives.
23.
relative
Data on landing areas and other survey type information
certain other atolls and islands scheduled for use as
scientific and weather stations was not available. Such surveys kd
to be nwde during the extreme last portionof the build-~p periods
in coordination with TG ?.S, in a rather hasty and thereby possib~
inexact manner.
2h. Port operation responsibility was assumed by (YI’G
703 dur@
127