rather than standardized usage 10SSO
TOO requisition items proved to be the most troublesome with
13-
.
respeot to early receipt as well as appropriate inventory.
I.k. Local purchase effected tiro~h HABG2N p~ved
difficult and
awkward in view of existi~= .HABCDi~
requirements,
15’. The reduction of Signal personnel to a skeleton force during the period between CASTLE and FJ31MMG resulted in inefficient
operations and the deteriorationof eqtipment and facilities throWh
the neglect of maintenance. It also made the build-up for REDMLNG
more difficult because of the lack of a sound nucleus.
26.
The organizational aspects of the present Joint Communica~
tion Facility have no official status. Tho~h
operations during
REDUINGproceeded smoothly this could lead to operational difficultics in the future, particularly in the event of personality mnfl.icts. REDWING communications operations didproducc s~me problems
in antrol$ administration and IoSistics*
1?.
The concept of handling classified traffic in clear text
form in the tape relay center, requiring the use of on-line enc~~a
radic channels and the special ap.moval of
tion equipment mall
landline circuits, was cf very little benefit operationally and did
n:t justify the tremendous expense and the danger to security introduced by this fcrm of operation. Also$ the use of three separate
rcuting indicator systems for the Joint Relay Center led to a great
anmunt of confusion in the handling of traffic.
18.
The operation of the JTF-7 Headquarters communication oonter
by personnel of N
7.2 proved undesirable inasmuch as a headquarters
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