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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D.C.
10 Roveaber 1953
Annex 1,¢o CJTF SEVEN Operation Plen No, 3-5}
COMMNTCATICNS
1.
General Remarks
a.
The odjectives of the basic plan are to:
(1) Conduct teste, commencing in January 1954, of weapcns and
experiwental devices in the ENIWETOK-BIKINI area to include technical and measurement programs proposed by the AEC and DOD.
(2) To provide for the security of the Joint task force plus
YNIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS.
bd. This annex establishes the policies and general plans for the
installation, maintenance and operation of comsun’cation-electronic
facilities of Joint Task Foree SEVEN. Further inforsation concerning commnication-electronic facilities of task groups will be found
an the operation orders of the task groups.
2.
Statement of the Situation. On 2] May 1952, the JCS designated the
Chief of Staff, US. Army as Executive Agent for an owerseas atomic
test operation (Operation CASTLE) and assigned the miszion of the
execution of CASTLE to the Commander, Joint Task Force 132. On 1
February 1953, JTF 132 was adainistratively redesignated as Joint
Task Force SEVEN (JTF SEVEN) with no change in the previously seaigied mission of conducting Operation CASTLE.
a. Enemy Situation. The Soviet Union has the following capsbilities which may affect the accomplishaent of our communication electronic mission.
(1) Monitoring or Intercept.
All low, medium and high frequency
radio circuits are subject to constant intercept from fixed land
positions or possibly from ships, aircraft or submarines.
In the
.
same sanner ant under favorable atmospheric conditions, VHF transmissions also are susceptible to active Soviet monitoring.
(2) Jamaing.
Although {t ds not expected that the Soviets will
take aggressive action to interfere with task force commnicationelectronic operations, they have demonstrated their capabilities in
UF jamming. There also are indications that they cre prepared to
jam in the VHF/UHF bands.
(5) Mher Interference. In addition, it is considered that
Ainterference with the communication-electronic mission or compranxiss
of ite activities could be affected by espionage, sabotage, overt
action by vessel or aircraft, raids, observations, unauthorized instrumentation and declaration of war.
bo. Friendly Situation. The following activities, outeide the task
force, will furnish communication-electronic support as indicated.
(1) National Security Agency (NSA) - will provide experimental
APSAY 604
cult.
(x) ciphony equipment for the USS ESTES firing party cir-
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