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(4) The ‘effect. of» delaying‘HARDTACK, upon programs
-
relating to devices that will be subjected to develop-
'
ment testing in 1958, would be the effect of the delay
on weapons with oAD's after June 1960.
It is not
possible to predict more specific effects than a
general 6~month slippage of such programs, which would
include advanced ballistic missile warheads, high yield
AA warheads, and clean weapcns of advanced design.
“However, since thepresentAEC“‘budgétsfor FY ©
1957 and FY 1958 provide for full-scale tests at both
proving grounds, the transfer of PILGRIM to the EPG
would probably not require additional AEC funds in FY 1957
or FY 1958.
‘The effect of changing PILGRIM to an overseas
operation will be to push completion of operation HARDTACK
further into FY 1959 and heavier AEC test costs (perhaps
$10 million) will fall in that year than would have other-
wise occurred,
It should be noted however, that the
AEC cost of a Pacific operation is probably omly one-third
_that of the DOD,
Ce ‘There would be a major loss of military and civil
effects programs since the Hill and Dale and the MET
effects. tests could not be effectivey conducted at EPG,
Although some parts of the scientific and technical
programs could be salvaged, this would require a complete
re-design of the effects test programs and effects test
groups in terms of scientific personnel,
budgeting.
logistics and
A majority of the, civil effects programs
associated with the MET shot would be lost.
of highest
.
importance would be loss of the Federal Civil Defense
Administration shelter program, which has been designed
and planned under Congressional prompting as represented
in part by testimony taken by the Holifield Committee,
The shelter program may amount to as much as $1.5 million
and represents more than 50% in costs of the total CETG
program,
Other programs deleted would amount to possibly
another 20%.
The poD effects programs would be hard hit
by deletion of the MET shot,
In addition, DOD would
lose their Hill and Dale effects test since the terrain
would not permit its conduct in the Pacific.
f£. There would be considerable detrimental effect on
the morale of participating laboratory personnel,
&. The ability of DOD and JTF-7 to support a PILGRIM
operation at EPG would be a very important consideration
in a decision to move this operation.
In order to conduct the operation at EPG, the concurrence and full
~ B-
Appendix "A"
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