Sere
3, Fallout Hazard.
Any of the three approaches will reduce
the expected fallout to some degree under that of the earlier
presented plan for PILGRIM.
Plan I, of course, would remove
possibility of fallout around NTS.
Plan II would assure that
off-site fallout on any community around NTS would be limited
to a low level and that the operation could be conducted with
relatively few long delays.
Plan III could be nearly as
effective as Plan II in limiting the fallout.
It is believed
‘that either Plan II or Plan III could be carried out with almost
certainty of success and without prohibitive delays under the
"10 R in 10 year criteria."
For neither II or III could such
assurance be given for a value of "5", or "6 R in 10 years."
4, Effect on Weapons Development Schedules.
Adoption of
Plan I would have a very unfavorable impact on the AEC and
the
DOD with respect to weapons readiness and development schedules,
and moraleof personnel.
of HARDTACK,
It would delay materially completion
Plan II could be adopted with some undesirable
effect on the weapons program.
somewhat.
It would prolong HARDTACK
Plan III would have little effect on weapons readiness
schedules, and would not delay or prolong Operation HARDTACK,
5. With respect to AEC funding, Plan I would probably not
require additional FY 1957 or FY 1958 funds, but would add some
$10 million to FY 1959 test costs because the 1957 Pacific
Operation would push Operation HARDTACK farther into FY 1959,
Plan II would require some $10 million additional funding
authority in FY 1957.
Pian III would result in relatively
minor adjustments in expenditure of funds.
6. Effect on DOD Effects Programs.
Plan I would have a
very detrimental effect on the DOD and Civilian Defense effects
~-2.
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