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support of DOD would be required.
This support must be
given on a very high priority basis in order to meet the
time scales envisaged, and with the knowledge that it
will interfere with competing DOD programs. Details
as to men, ships and aircraft required as DOD support,
and the disadvantageous aspects of the plan from the
standpoint of the JTF operations, are summarized in
Appendix "pb",
h. The weather during the proposed EPG firing period
(November 1957-January 1958) would be extremely poor for
firing.
If yields are held to those now planned this
should not cause undue difficulty.
However, since
|
PILGRIM would force HARDTACK (if conducted as a separate
operation) to slip into the Fall or Winter of 1958, the
weather situation would be unfavorable for successful
conduct of HARDTACK.
Some of the more serious weather
problems aSsociated with test operations at EPG are
outlined in Appendix "p".
3. Plan II would limit shots to be fired in Nevada to the
20 shots (see App. "B") which have a degree of difficulty (as
defined in Appendix "c") of less than 3,0, and move the remaining
6 shots to the Pacific to be fired in the first part of Operation
HARDTACK.
The "easy" shots would then be fired in two phases
at NTS as presently scheduled.
The six shots to be moved to the
4
Pacific under Plan It are:
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Movement of th eSe Shots would have the following implications:
a. Off-site fallout on any community around NTS would
be limited to a low level and the operation could be
conducted with relatively few long delays,
b. Approximately $10 million dollars additional funding
authority in FY 1957 would be required. ‘The FY 1958 budget,
under this plan appears adequate.
c, Implications on our weapons readiness schedules would
be as follows:
- 9 -
SPODIRT
RAT iNdb
Appendix "a"