objectives, with one exception: the objective of Project 3.2 was reduced from true crater
measurement to apparent crater measurement, because the probability of meaningtul
data did not justify the support effort required. An additional project was approved at
this time: Project 3.4, Minefield Clearance, under Navy sponsorship.
The possibility of expanding the objective of Project 1.4 to include underwater pressureversus-time measurements from a surface burst over deep water was explored. Althoug::
LASL agreed to relocation of one of the barge shots to a position outside of the lagoon,
with certain restrictions, the estimated yields of the devices then scheduled were tou
high to make a satisfactory test probable. In view of this and the additional support ia-
volved, the matter was dropped.
During the operational phase, the following projects were edded to the military-effect
test program:
,
Project 2.7 (Study of Radiation Fallout by Oceanographic Methods) was added to obtain
Commander
Joint Tosk Force 7
rr
Other
Task Groups
©
Commander
Chief
Tosk Group 7.1
I
Other
Tesk Units
Task
Commdnder
Unit 13
{o
Field Command, AFSWP
Directorate
Weapons Effects Tests
Projects
Figure 1.1 Organizational relationships.
additional fallout data by employment of water sampling and other techniques in freeocean areas.
Project 3.5 (Blast Effects on Miscellaneous Structures) was added to document the
damage to shore facilities arising from the unexpectedly high yield of Shot 1.
Project 4.1 (Study of Response of Human Beings Accidentally Exposed to Radiation
Due to Fallout from High Yield Weapons) was added to document, incidental to medical
treatment, observations of personnel evacuated from those atolls east of Bikini unex-
’ pectedly contaminated by fallout from Shot 1.
The physical damage and adverse radiological situation arising from Shot 1, coupled
with repeated postponements of subsequent events because of weather, placed the military-
effect participation in subsequent shots on a tentative basis. In particular, the adverse
effects of the following factors were very real: (1) gradual loss of personnel as their
total accumulative radiation dosage exceeded the maximum limit because of radiological
contamination of Bikini Atoll land areas to which entry was mandatory for project purposes; (2) loss of equipment by Projects 2.2 and 2.5 by a seoondary fire from Shot 1 on
the Tare Island support facility; (3) conversion from land-based to ship—based operations
at Bikini after Shot 1, with attendant difficulties of personnel transport, communications,
16