Giles Operation Plan © CTG 7.3 No. 1-53 hostilities, in view of their inability to approach the Operational Atolls undetected. There is a possibility that the USSR night attempt the employment of small surface craft, such as fishing boats, for instrumentation and observation. There is a more remote possibility that the Soviet might attempt the landing of raiders or saboteurs from a small, fast surface craft launched from a larger surface vessel. As in the case of submarines, attempted lagoon penetration is possible but unlikely. c. USSR Air Capabilitics. No information in addition to that set forth in Annex C to CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53. dad. (Conclusions. Of the foregoing capabilities, the following are those which it is considered the USSR is most likely to attempt, unter present world conditions: (1) Espionage, (2) Unauthorized instrumentation by submarine, surface vessel or (3) Observation or photography by submarine or aircraft. aircraft. (4) Sabotage. If it decided to initiate war with the U.5S., the Soviet might well attempt overt action (direct attack) by ships or aircraft, or raids, immediatcly prececing or in conjunction with the opening of hcstilities. DNA 17