= Qperation Plan CTG 7.3 No. 1-53 be much more difficult. Useful information by this means could be obtained at considerable distances from the Atoll. (B) To observe and photograph the installations and detonations. The limitations of submarine periscope observation and photography are such that a submarine would have to approach within three (3) miles, and preferably one (1) mile, to obtain useful information of shot sites. Even then, it is highly doubtful if any detailed information could be obtained, but only information indicating the general progress of work, including instrumentation. Radar observation or radar photographs could supplement the information obteined by other means. Useful visual, radar or photographic information of the detonations could, of course, be obtained from much greater distances. (C) Direct attack by gunfire could harass the operation but would probably result in little damage tc installations or injury to personnel. On the other hand, such attacks would result in the detection and probable eventual cestruction of the submarine. While no information is available indicating that the USSR have modified submarines for guided missile launching, there is no reason to believe that they could not do so if they so desired, in view of the relatively simple modifications required and the widely publicized U.S. accomplishments in this field. A properly directed, submarine-leunched guided missile, fitted with an atomic warhead, could inflict great damage to installations and injury to personnel and thus seriously interfere with the Operation. USSR submarines also have the capability of attacking ships of the Joint Task Force with torpedoes. The presence of an escort could indicate that the ship or ships escorted are considered valuable. It is considered that direct attack probably would precede or accompany the opening of hostilities by the USSR, although the USSR might possibly take the risk of attempting to launch an undetected submarinelaunchcd guided missile in the hope that the resulting atomic cxplosion might be considered (by the U.S.) as the accidental or premature explosion of one of the test devices or a component thereof. (D) Raids and Sabotage. ss discussed above. (=) Lagoon penetration could be attempted by a submarine assigned any of the foregoing missions. However, lagoon penetration is not necessary for the accomplishment of any of them and involves definite acditional risks of detection and destruction. . DONA (2) Other USSR Naval Capabilities. USSR surface ships also have capabilitics for unauthorized instrumentation, cbservation, photography, | landing of raiders and saboteurs and direct attack, but except as noted below, it is most unlikcly their employment would be attempted, short of actual SS Das os +t ,2e