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Maj. John D. Servis, Commander,
=UNCLRSED=
March 6, 1953

T. L. Shipman, M. D.

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(Lae
SET of 1948,

8 4s in somevhat belated reply to your memo of 13 February 1953.

T have

sely been slow in answering in order thet I might have full opportunity

discuse the matter thoroughly with those people whom I consider the best
horities on these problems. My comments will be general rather than
cific and will perhaps cover a good deal more territory than was actually

quired by your request.

far as actual health hasards at Operation Castle are concerned, there is
+ much one can say except that they will be similar to those at previous

iSniwetok operations only more so.

The possibilities and the dangers of fall

Igit should be no greater than has been the case in the past. With detonetions
f
high yield it becomes extremely difficult to predict the shape and location
wef the fall-out pattern. Some material obviously is coming down somewhere,
jand there can never be any positive assurance that some of this will not land
. \@a inhabited islands or on ships of the Task Fores. If this does happen, it

\sl@reates an annoying situstion, but in all probability not one which can in any
Y Wey be regarded as truly hasardous.
It mist be admitted that some uncertain6,

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33

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by authority of the U aude
ER

HEALTH HAZARDS OF OPERATION CASTLE
K

wa

$ies regarding this matter still exist, and if all conditions were just right,

&t might be possible to produce a situation more than annoying, at least in

the immediate vicinity of the shot islands.

m

One situation which will be somewhat different from previous tests involves
the necessity of having ships of the Task Force enter contaminated waters.

It is difficult to assess the amount of trouble this might cause, but examination of the pertinent data from Operation Crossroads indicates that the
contamination which will ba acquired by ships operating in such waters may
be a nuisance but will not approach hesardous conditions.
Right here we encounter one problem which has been a troublesome one in the

past, namely, the reluctance of naval officers to permit their blessed ships
to become even moderately contaminated, JI regard it as essential that «
reasonable understanding be arrived at well in advance between CJTF-7 and

’ CTG 7.3.

The naval Task Group must be made to realise ani to accept the

fect that wa are not goirg to make an omelet without breaking eggs.

If the

Navy is to provide the support for the operation which is oalled for, they

mist be prepared to acoept a certain amount of contemination of their ships.

It is my opinion, and that of those with whom I have discussed this problen,
thet this contamination will not reach serious proportions and that the

REPOSITORY

decay of the fission products together with natural and man-made decontanination will so reduce the contamination that extensive ovéThenl after return
uite unnecessary,

COLLECTION
BOX No.

FOLDER CL dp Cysee

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