'
November, 1955, but I think itis
y
probable that they would not have done
so until much later. In the actual world
they had the powerful stimulus of
knowing from our November 1952 test
that there was some much better, prob-
ably novel way of designing hydrogen
bombsso as to produce muchlarger explosions than the one they demonstrated
in their August 1953 experiment. A careful analysis of the radioactive fallout
from the Mike explosion may well have
provided them with useful information
concerning how to goabout it. In
the hypothetical world where the U.S.
would have followed the OppenheimerLilienthal advice that stimulus and information would have been absent.
Moreover, a comparison of the way nu-
clear-weapons technology advanced in
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during that
period makes it seem likely there would
have been a much longer delay—probably some years~before they took that
big and novel a step without such stim-
uli and information. Therefore in the
most probable alternative world the first
Russian superbomb test would have
been delayed until well after the first
American superbomb test (in other
words, delayed until 1957 or 1958),
whereas in the worst plausible alternative world it would have occurred just
whenit did in the actual world: in August, 1955.
What would the U.S. have done in
the meantime?
It would have been known immediately that the Russian explosion of Au-
gust, 1953, was partly thermonuclear
andthat this test was many times as big
concerning thermonuclear reactions on
one assumesthat following this Russian
ing President Truman’s 1950 decision,
great progress in computer technology
between 1950 and 1953. Whenthereal
Mike test was being planned, fast electronic computers such as MANIAC and
the first untvac either were not quite
this later time, however, would have
their operating career. By a year or so
later they were in full running order and
much experience had been gained in
as the Russians’ previous explosions. If
test the American program in the worst
plausible world would have gone along
just as it did in the actual world follow-
then the U.S. would have set off the
Mike explosion in April, 1956. A simple
duplication of those earlier events at
been unlikely. Any analysis of U.S, reactions to technological advances by
the U.S.S.R. shows that the detection of
the August 1953 event would havere-
sulted in the initiation of a very large,
high-priority American program to pro-
duce a bigger and better thermonuclear
device. Such a program would undoubtedly have had broader support than the
one actually mounted in the spring of
1950. Moreover, the general scientific
and technological situation in which a
hydrogen-bomb program would have
been embedded in 1953 would have
been significantly different from the ac-
tual one in 1950. For one thing, the
kind of theoretical work in progress on
the Super before President Truman’s decision would have continued and would
have provided a solider base from which
to launch a crash program. In addition
the booster program would presumably
have continued along the path already
set for it in 1948 (which inchided a test
of the principle in 1951), and therefore
in 1953 there would have been available somereal experimental information
a smaller scale.
Last but not least, there had been
operating or were in the early stages of
their utilization, so that they would have
been much moreeffective in connection
with any hypothetical post~Joe 4 Ameri-
can crash program.Forall these reasons
it is plausible to assume that the U.S.
would havearrived at somethinglike the
Teller-Ulam design for a multimegaton
superbomb either in the same length of
time or, even more likely, in a somewhat
shorter period, say sometime between
September, 1955, and April, 1956.
These dates bracket the actual date
when the Russians arrived at roughly the
same point in the acmal world. A few months’ difference either way at that
stage of the program, however, would
not have been meaningful. It takes quite
a long time, typically several years, to
go from the proof of a prototypeto the
deployment of a significantly large number of weapons based on it. Differences
in production capacity would have
played a much more importantrole than
any small advantage in the date of the
first experiment, and such differences as
then existed surely favored the U-S.
Hence even in the worst plausible alternative world the nuclear balance
would not have been upset. Moreover,
in the most probable alternative world
the date the Russians would have arrived at that stage would have been delayed until well after the first large U.S.
Mike-like explosion had showed them
there was a better way; thus in this most
I: short, the common notion that has
persisted since late 1949 that some
sort of disaster would have resulted from
folowing the Oppenheimer-Lilienthal
advice is in retrospect almost surely
wrong. Moreover, even if by some un-
J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER AND EDWARD TELLERmetat a Washington reception in
1963. Behind the two men is Glenn T. Seaborg, who was then chairman of the AEC. At the
left is Oppenheimer’s wife. Oppenheimer had just received the Fermi Award of the AEC.
Ten years earlier, in the aftermath of the secret debate over whether or not the U.S. shoald
proceed with the developmentof the hydrogen bomb,he had been banned from all Government work by virtue of the fact that bis security clearance had been removed. Teller had
been a leading advocate of the development of the hydrogen bomb from the early 1940's.
The General Advisory Committee of the AEC, of which Oppenheimer was chairman, had
recommended in 1949 that the U.S. not initiate an “all-out” effort to develop the Super.
1{?
vo
likely quirk of fate the Russians had
achieved the Superbomb first, the large
stock of fission bombsin the U.S. arsenal,
together with the 500-kiloton all-fission
bomb for those few cases where it
would have been appropriate, would
have adequately ensured the national
security of the U.S.
This history and the conjectures about
possible alternative pasts show that Op-
furvhie Pankd in anigene.
Statford Wa’
W DOE/UCLA
probable case the U.S. wouldstill have
enjoyed a substantial lead.