gloomy picture of its possibilities 4rder to reinforce their basically ethical opposition to its development. Given the technological circumstances then prevailing, this statement of the program’s prospects could hardly have been more positive. Buckley and Oppenheimer. In part 1 said: “We base our recommendation on our belief that the extreme dangers to mankindinherentin the proposal wholly outweigh any military advantage that could come from this development. Let it be clearly realized that this is a super Thereport then discussed what might be called the “strategic economics” of the Super as they were then conceived: weapon;it is in a totally different category from an atomic bomb. The reason for developing such super bombs would tion has been solved, there is no limit to would involve a decision to slaughter a vast number of civilians, Weare alarmed as to the possible global effects of the radioactivity generated by the explosion “A second characteristic of the super bombis that once the problem of initia- the explosive power of the bombitself except that imposed by requirements of delivery. [In addition there will be] very grave contamination problems which can easily be made more acute, and may possibly be rendered less acute, by surrounding the deuterium with uranium or other material. ... It is clearly impossible with the vagueness of design and the uncertainty as to performance as we have them at present to give anything like a cost estimate of the super. If one uses thestrict criteria of damagearea per dollar, it appears uncertain to us whether the super will be cheaper or more expensive than the fission bombs.” In Part HI the committee members got to whatto them was the heart of the matter, the question of whether or not the Super should be developed: “Although the members of the Advisory Committee are not unanimous in their proposals as to what should be done with regard to the super bomb, there are certain elements of unanimity among us. Weall hope that by one means or anoth- er the development of these weapons can be avoided. Weare all reluctant to see the United States take theinitiative in precipitating this development. We are all agreed that it would be wrongat the present moment to commit ourselves to an all-out effort toward its develop-. ment. “We are somewhat divided as to the nature of the commitment not to develop the weapon. The majority feel that this should be an unqualified commitment. Others feel that it should be made conditional on the response of the Soviet be to have the capacity to devastate a vast area with a single bomb. Its use In the two addenda those membersof the committee who werepresent(thatis, all except Seaborg) explained their reasons for their proposed “commitment not to develop the weapon.” The first addendum was written by Conant and signed by Rowe, Smith, DuBridge, fundamental ethical principlesto initiate a program of development of such a weapon. At the same time it would be appropriate to invite the nations of the world to join us in a solemn pledge not to proceed in the development of construction of weapons ofthis category.” As with the majority, Fermi and Rabi also explicitly took up the possibility never be produced. Mankind would be that the Russians might proceed on their own, or even go back on a pledge not to: “If such a pledge were accepted even without control machinery, it appears highly probable that an advanced state of developmentleading to a test by another power could be detected by available physical means. Furthermore, we have in our possession, in our stockpile until the present climate of world opin- duction or use of a ‘Super. 29 of a few super bombs of conceivable magnitude. If super bombs will work at ail, there is no inherent limit in the de- structive power that may be:attained with them. Therefore, a super bomb might become a weapon of genocide. “We believe a super bomb should far better off not to have a demonstration of the feasibility of such a weapon ion changes. “In determining not to proceed to de- velop the super bomb, we see a unique opportunity of providing by example some limitations on the totality of war and thus of limiting the fear and arousing the hopes of mankind.” Coty to a frequently suggested notion, the members of the Oppenheimer committee were not at all unmindful of the possibility that the U.S.S.R. might develop the Super no matter what the U.S. did. Indeed, they regarded it as entirely possible and ex- plained why it would not be crucial: “To the argument that the Russians may succeed, in developing this weapon, we would reply that our undertakingit will of atomic bombs, the means for ade- quate ‘military’ retaliation for the proOn December 2 and 3, five weeks after the special meeting, the General Advisory Committee convened’for one of its regularly scheduled meetings and carefully reviewed the question of the Super once again. According to Richard G. Hewlett, the AEC’s official histo- rian, Oppenheimerreported to the com- missioners that no member wished to change the views expressed in the October 30 report. For a time it appeared that the views of the Oppenheimer committee had a chance of being accepted. David E. Lilienthal, chairman of the AEC, was receptive to the committee’s point of view. He similarly favored two parallel responses to the Russian test: (1) in- not prove a deterrent to them. Should creasing the productionoffission weapons and developing a greater variety of sals by our large stock of atomic bombs and (2) officially announcing our inten- use of a ‘“Super.’” Super while simultaneously reopening and intensifying the search for international controlof all kinds of weapons of ¢ mass destruction. Lilienthal considered © they use the weapon against us, repri- would be comparably effective to the The minority addendum, signed by Fermi and Rabi, expressed even stronggovernment to a proposal to renounce er opposition to the Super but loosely such development. The Committee rec- coupled an American renunciation with ommends that enough be declassified — a proposal for a worldwide pledge not to about the super bombso that a public proceed: “It is clear that the use of such statementof policy can be made atthis a weapon cannot be justified on any time.” a whole, It is necessarily an evil thing consideredin anylight. “For these reasons we believe it important for the President of the United States to tell the American public, and the world, that we think it wrong on ethical ground which gives a human be- ing a certain individuality and dignity even if he happensto be a resident of an enemy country. “The fact that no limits exist to the destructiveness of this weapon makes its very existence and the knowledge of its construction a danger to humanity as them, particularly for tactical situations, tion to refrain from proceeding with the the complete reliance on weapons of g mass destruction to be a fundamental = Q weakness in U.S. policy, and he viewed -g a “crash” program on the hydrogen & bombas foreclosing what might be thes= last good opportunity to base U.S. for-os eign policy on “something better than a headlong rush into war with weapons of mass destruction.” “We are,” he said, “today relying on an asset that is readilv depreciatingforus, i.e., weapons of mass destruction. [A decision to go ahead with 109 o ay