Ren # contrary to the policy followed in Operation IVY, which was to have served as a funding guide for Operation CASTLE, These reversals of the policy which was established in the initial instructions for Operation CASTLE caused confusion and mimmderstanding of the funding responsibilities on the part of personnel of Task Group 7.4 and AFSWC, and required many telephone calls, messages, and visits to resolve the problems as they arose. This procedure was not conducive to efficient operations and caused delays in procurement of services and meric B. BEST AVAILAB)& Copy pn, EP = CONCLUSIONS The following conclusions were arrived at by the Task Group 7.4 Comptroller at the end of Operation CASTLE: 1. The McNeil memorandum outlined, in broad terms, division of funding between the services and the Task Force. 2. Principles of fumding were assumed to be on the same general basis as was followed during Operation IVY until the first reversal of policy was made by Joint Task Force SEVEN. USAF did not anticipate the se changes and therefore explicit instructions were not issued to cov~ er all funding problems. USAF was placed in the position of resolving each problem as it arose. 3. Major air commands participating in the operation did not re- ceive specific funding information early enough to include fund requirements for CASTLE in their Fiscal Year 1954 budgets. 4. Decisions which had to be obtained, when a change was made in the funding concept, created serious delays in the procurement of. important services and materiel for the support of Operation CASTLE. AFWL/Hio aHeRET Pim