Soil Cleanup Operations k we mee ee Set a re a Pee : . 387 as occur in nuclear explosions. The AEC Task Group had recommended a lifestyle for Enewetak which would limit residence to southern islands but , are tel Sa mas Sl would permit coconut agriculture in the northeast.>2 Utilizing NVO-140 data and methodology, the estimated doses to individuals would be no more than 30 percent of the AEC’s recommendations.*3 The methodology used by Dr. Bramlitt differed in several respects from the methodology used in the previous estimates. First, the Bramlitt estimates considered that each Enewetak person would obtain subsistence coconuts from specific northeast islands, rather than from the entire group of northeast islands. Thus, those persons having agriculture rights limited to a more highly contaminated northeast island ‘were predicted to receive a higher dose than if some of their 7 Ea vai) - ee S. rs ne. nae g = ee iRy : Ape pebe cae rd pape: Cpe reNeaoSSee eae aT a a Ter Py Pitat Eel a 1. al ae ae a - > om é 7 Sad ar ee ee Ar gts ivy caea ee" i” m fn ae?Chee coconuts came from the lowercontaminated islands. Second, the Bramlitt estimates assumed coconut consumption to be much greater than previously estimated. The increase in consumption was based upon statements from individuals living at Ujelang, and it made allowances for other pathways involving coconuts for which there were no radiological data; e.g., fermented coconut sap, skin lotions, cooking oils, and meat consumed from animals raised on coconuts. Additionally, the recently discovered higher radiation levels among the people of Bikini Atoll were attributed to larger amounts of coconut in their diet than had been previously estimated.°4 Third, the Bramlitt estimates used Bikini data made available after publication of NVO-140. The Bikini data predicted greater uptake of radionuclides by coconuts. Dr. Bramlitt’s draft study recommended: (I) evaluating the impact of not planting coconuts on northeastislands; (2) collecting additional data on fission products at Enewetak while support forces were available; (3) reevaluating the diet assumed for the dri-Enewetak after cleanup; and (4) reassessing the dose for the postcleanup use of Enewetak Atoll. The Director, DNA was briefed on the dose estimate study on 21 July 1978. The draft study then was distributed on 27 July 1978 to DOE -- + + ‘ (Headquarters and NV), members of the Enewetak Advisory Group (Bair Committee), and the Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute with a request for expeditious review, since the study indicated that changes might be desirable in the cleanup or rehabilitation programs then underway. Based in part on the new data from measurementsof the Bikini people and the recent experience of having to relocate them from Bikini Atoll, DOE recommended to DOI that coconut trees not be planted on the northern islands of Enewetak Atoll. It is possible that Dr. Bramlitt’s dose estimate, raising much the same type of question, reinforced the DOE staff thinking. While this staff view had little effect on the DOD cleanup effort, it had the potential to exert a significant effect on the DOI rehabilitation erggatas Bi AiPeetescan Renta aie tate ay ou SL Et ease ER . - Seats Pest y Saha aa eT ate ee < seh hen RT ee ire eitoage bicget pester eat se vad os a Sora ae i Seese eRee gl AE pee ee Badca ee eeae ate ee. 5) ok