Soil Cleanup Planning

RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL

and priority as the Lujor
serious questions about |
position of Army enginee
Runit soil cleanup, 1.e., it
resources available could
otherislands specified in t
Enewetak. His support,
later in this chapter, ever
leaders at Headquarters a
the project, not to devote
before the other islands
proven futile, resulted i
containment operations,

THE PRIORITY ISSUE
In its report on the August 1977 conference, the Bair Committee
expressed concern that the cleanup project could be terminated before
completion if funds and other resources appropriated for the effort proved
insufficient due to underestimates of the amount of soil that had to be

removed.28 This concern was shared by BG Tate and COL Treat, who

made their first visit to the atoll shortly after the conference adjourned.
The EIS identified four islands requiring cleanup of plutonium
concentrations over 400 pCi/g: Boken, Lujor, Aomon, and Runit. Eight

others in the 40 to 400 pCi/g range were listed for consideration on a caseby-case basis: Bokoluo (Alice), Bokombako (Belle), Kirunu (Clara), Louj
(Daisy), Mijikadrek (Kate), Kidrinen (Lucy), Aej (Olive), and Eleleron

the people any other curr

(Ruby). To these, the CONPLAN and OPLAN added Enjebi for

man-hours to Enjebi without more assurance that resources would be
available to complete the items specifically required in the EIS. He was
particularly concerned about Runit, where 58 percent of the radiological
cleanup work identified in Case 3 of the EIS would be required. Therefore,
during his visit, BG Tate and Mr. Ray, the ERSP Manager, agreed to
move out on identifying the work to remove plutonium from the burial
crypts on Aomon, identifying the Lujor soil removal requirement, and
characterizing the nature and scope of work to clean Runit to required

levels, 30

After BG Tate’s visit, Mr. Ray, in a letter to Field Command, expressed
surprise that the cleanup of Runit was considered so important. He asked
what level of confidence Field Command expected in the Runit
characterization the ERSP was being tasked to carry out and what priority
it should receive. He indicated that ERDA-NV could identify the work
required to clean Runit or couid assist in preparing a reclama to leave
Runit uncleaned and quarantined. He hinted that additional funding from
DNA might be required for detailed Runit soil characterization.2! BG Tate
replied that he did not consider the reclama proposal to be a viable option
and that the radiological survey of Runit should meet the same standards
t

.

patere °

ae eg mR ti Bis g bmn. |

levels below 40 pCi/g29. BG Tate was unwilling to devote so many

On 12 September1977,
to discuss the cleanup fF
discussions at ERDA h

eo ea em ee

consideration on a case-by-case basis. When BG Tate arrived, work was
beginning on Enjebi in accordance with the initial strategy, with a view
toward continuing its cleanup to qualify it for eventual residential use.
Since Enjebi was not identified for cleanup under Case 3 of the EJS andit
could require 6 months or longer to accomplish the cleanup, there was
considerable opposition to going ahead with this effort. CONPLAN 1-76
estimates indicated that over 27,750 man-hours would be required to
remove debris from the .island and over 24,000 man-hours would be
required to remove the plutonium-contaminated soil concentrations to

characterization of Run

Stressed that it was
contaminated soil for rer
be permitted to evolve in

DNA funding. The Dire:

might be needed if ther
criteria and the EIS criter
Other issues in the soil
in the discussions at Ef
previously had received
EPA guidelines for all tre
in draft form by variou
apply to Enewetak, then
advised DNA that it »
guidelines would not ap!
ERDA also advised D
were intended to apply
identified in the AEC T
potential dose to people

patterns investiaged,>4

inhalation dose were Pi
e.g., Pu-238 and amer
based on concentratior
during the AEC Radi
maximum permissible c
The dri-Enewetak, how

Select target paragraph3