Wersgall
Nevertheless. the AEC declared that Bikini
was safe. ‘‘There is virtually no radiation
left.’" one AEC official stated in 1969, ‘‘and
we can find no discernible effect on plant or
animal life.”
A Complete Fatlure
In 1969 the first Bikinians returned to
their atoll! to assist in the resettlement project.
The Department of the Interior (DOI) began
construction on 40 homes. Bikini Island and
Eneu, a nearby island, were bulldozed. and
the topsoil was turned over to reduce radiation. By the end of the year, 50,000 new trees
were planted on the islands.
All signs pointed to a happy ending for
the Bikinians. In 1971 the director of the
AEC’s Division of Operational! Safety reported
that numerous well water samples had been
taken from several locations on Bikini Island
and that, “‘froma radiological viewpoint, the
water is safe to drink.” In late 1973 the
United States announced that construction on
Bikini was nearly complete. and that ‘if all
is acceptable to the people. the trust territory
government is prepared to allow them to re-
turn to Bikini Aroll permanently by Christ-
mas this year."’
As the Bikinians began to return to their
atoll, however, DOI recognized chat a new,
more thorough. radiological survey of Bikini
was needed. In 1972 the AEC had made such
a survey of Enewetak. a Marshallese atoll
also used as a nuclear test site. Instruments
used in the Enewetak survey, such as airborne
sensors. were far more sensitive and accurate
than the equipment used to conduct the 1967
survey of Bikini. The Enewetak survey was
the starting point of a massive cleanup bythe
U.S. government. and most of the Enewe-
Rogers C. B. Morton,alarmed by the findings
of routine. “unsophisticated radiological sur-
veys, halted construction on Bikini Island.
He wrote to Defense Secretary James R.
Schlesinger several months later. in March
1975, torequest that a thorough survey be
conducted on Bikini, warning that “despite
assurances that the atoll is safe, the attirudes
and fears of the people are being influenced
by various outside groups, many of whom
are critics of the nuclear program ” In order
to ‘avoid... the loss of our credibility” with
the Bikinians, Morton concluded, ‘‘we must
answer the critics.”
The Interior Department needed the Defense Department's (DOD) logistical support
for the survey, for neither Interior nor the
Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration (ERDA}—successor to the AEC
and precursor to the Department of Energy
(DOE}—had the logistical capability or the
money to conduct the survey. But aithough
Morton's letter said that ERDA was prepared
to conduct a radiological survey in April.
DOD did not even respond until the end of
May. when it stated thac it could conduct
the survey ata ‘reimbursable cost” of $609.000. Since Interior had no funds for reimbursement. Defense declined to take on the
task.
DO! tried again in June. Interior bluntly
stated in a letter that it was ‘‘deeply concerned that a quality radiological survey such
as that performed on Enewetak. whose people
will not be coming back for some time, cannot
be made available in a timely fashion for the
Bikinians whose return is imminent.’’ Warn-
ing that ‘‘none of the involved departments
has budgeted adequately for this needed and
highly warranted effort in order to meet our
takese now are being resettled in the southern
statutory and moral commitmentsto the peo-
free of contamination by the tests. A debate
United States required “a strong reaffirmation
by all concerned agencies to work together in
carrying out a comprehensive program.” But
part of their atoll, which was left relatively
simmers, however, over whether to permit resettlement of Enjebi, an island in the north
whose radiation levels exceed federal stan-
ple of this area.”’ the letter concluded that the
no survey was conducted.
Meanwhile, some Bikinians had expressed
dards.
In late 1974, Secretary of the Interior
a desire to build homesin the interior of the
86.
87.