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designated ares witht negative resulfew This was somaviaw surprisity singe
one would have expecte: this airerafe to contact® the southerrs edgp of the f
out. from the twenty to forty thousand foct leveles Thus itt appeared the-
debris took a somewhat, more northerly course thas was forecasite
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:
td
9 4
Se Subsequent {/TLSON flights: for UNION were cancelleds
6, VEATHER RUCONNATSS..NCE FLIGHTSs
Three. weather reconnaissance flights were flows on UNION plus one day.
These flights to the west, south, ant the northeas® were negative except for
a L Mrfir contact 800 miles to the northeast of Ground Zero at plus thirty—
three hours.
7.
.FOQAT-1 FLIGHTS:
wPOi\P~L sponsored flights mate rmidicactive sample collections of UNION
debris at several remete locations. In all cases the jebria was found to be
wilely dispersed throughout the general. area but, as one would expect, the
levels were quite low ranging from a few Mr/Rr to a small fraction of that
anount.
The results of these collections are tabulated belows
ZEBR. TIME
POSITION
aLTITUDE.
27/2000 ~ 27/2200
20N 162W to 21N 15a
11,000
1.7
28/0930 ~ 28/1330
22N 156! to 23N 154W
15,000
2nd.
28/2030 ~ 29/0200
22N 152W to 27N 15aW
16,000
0.7
02/2100 ~ 02/2240
23N ll6W to 23N 1L7W
18,000
1,0
(plus 50-60 hours)
(plus 65-69 hours)
(plus 74-79 Hours)
(plue 7 days)
9.
(300 Mi south Hawait)
(250 Mi north Hawaii
(250 Mi northeast Hawaii
(600 Mi south San Diego)
counts/MIN/He
(in millions)
CONCLUSIONS:
ae The jir Rad Safe operations for UNION were quite successful. In
particular, the cloud tracking sperationa early est2blished the fact that
there were no elements of the UNION cloud or fallout which necassitated the
evacuaticn of nearby atolls.
&,
The use of the "B29 'ITLSON cloud tracking aircraft as a means for
making a preliminary survey of the populated atolls to the southeast of Cround
Zero provei practical. These aircraft provided the Task Foree Commander with
information he required on shot day and which was available from no other
source.e
No35