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The firet atteapt to Mire ROMEO wae 13 March. Be$ day advisorics witd
dispatched to the external agencies (Chairman, al, C/S army and CINCPACILT)
scheduling HOUuBO for 1306400. A search sester wae flow: on 11 Marek to 800
NLi to identify shipping in the area. Negative results were obtained. A
500 Mi: segtor search was flown on 12 March te identity shipping, to determine
course and speed, and to attempt to turn all siivping ocuteide a 500 NU sector
225°to 90° True (the forecast significant fall-out sone) for H to H plus 24
hours.
No contacts were aade by the search aircraft.
|
§
F
The task force headquarters and tasie group staffs deployed to Bikini
on the lith and 12th of Merch, By noom on 12 Larch the aynoptis weather situation was such that, although s complete series of pre-ehot advisorice were
‘issued to external and interns] ageneies, statements were included that it
was not anticipated ROMEO would be fired on schedule
ees the winds and
weather improved. It sppeared that deep easterlies were dominating the wind
flow pattern, & fact which materialisod by the evening of 12 “arch. At ZLOOf
on 12 arch, all. advisory addressees were notified that, due
effect of high clouds on the essential sampling effort and an umfavorable
fall-out pattern, RO; GO was ro-echeduled for 1906L0M, but that if weather ©
permitted, the capability was being meintained ta a
to 1,064,0M,
e this
Deep easterlies prevailed through 18 March, during whiokh tise an 1a
hour capability of firing n0:E0 wae asintained. By
on the 19th, the
forecast for shot time the following day waa for east-southeast winds from '
surface to 23,000 feet, southwest to 55,000 feet and easterlies above 55,000.
A series of Command dricfings and pre~shot advisories were again coapleted.
However, ty 21L00M on the 19th, it was apparent that thw southwesterlics
were not mterializing, and the shot was postponed for 24 hours.
During the intorval between tha two attenpts to shoot, it was spparcnt
that the IVY search plan for the protcetion of transient shipping was not
flexible enough te cope with the large shifts in the long rangs forecast
fall-out pattern which could ocour over a period of two days before a shot.
Advances contacts were required to detect and turn shipping out of the large
areas which could reasonubly he expected to lie in the full-out zone. As
the pre-shot schedule progressed, changes in wind forecasts reflected theasulves in corresponding shifts in the forecast significant fall-out area.
As 4 consequence, not only was auch seareh affort usually wasted, but far
more important, the time rannining in which to divurt a slow-moving surface
vessel became inadequats. Further, although advance arrangements had buen
made with CLICTACFLT to divert shipping outside a 500 Ni{ sector ares centered on GZ from southwest. through north to ernst from H to H plus 24 hours,
this action applied only to U.S. shipping plus such cther vessels as occa~
sionally camp within the knowledge and ecordination of CIICTACTLT commands.
AS & consequence, tha search plan was ruvised to specify as an enlarged Dan=
ger Area, a 450 NM sector centercd on L2N, 1648 with limiting true bearings
of 240° cloekwise through 95°. Notices to all nationalities were issued
Lel