TOP SECRET TOP Seer In conclusion Secretary Quarles pointed out that the three services in presenting their individual add-on programs would do 80 1.3 8 result of individual appraisal of the needs of each of the services by that service. The total of the resulting sums would, Secretary Quarles thought, doubtless be well in excess of what we judge to be feasible in the light of our overall fiscal situation. Accordingly, at the next Council meeting on this sub- ‘ } ject, Secretary Quarles indicated that the Department of Defense would be in a position to present a Defense Department package containing the approved add-on programs as opposed to the individual service estimates of what was required by way of add-on programs. When Secretary Quarles had concluded his portion of the presentation, the President pointed out that Secretary Quarles had made mention that the Department of Defense as such was taking over direction of all the satellite programs. Secretary Quarles had then proceeded to mention the program for achieving an Air Force recomnaisance satellite. Did this mean that the Defense Department was not taking over direction of all satellite programs? Secretary McElroy assured the President that all such programs would be taken over from the individual services by the Department of Defense. He then called upon Secretary Brucker to discuss the FY 1959 Army program. Secretary Brucker indicated that both he and General Taylor would deal with this subject. General Taylor first exhibited a chart entitled, "Application of Resources within Expenditure | Ceiling of 8.6 Billion for FY 1959". After explaining the application of resources, General Taylor stated his strong agreement with the comments of earlier speakers as to the seriousness of reducing Army deployments and capabilities in Western Europe and in Korea. General ‘ Taylor felt that there were three serious problems. The first was the reduction of Army overseas deploymente, the second was the reduction of mobile strategic divisions at home in the U.S. and the third was the slow Prognses in the development of continental defense. If these problems could/be satisfactorily solved, the U.S. Army and our Allies would find themselves at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the USSR as the military capabilities of the latter continued to increase. Secretary Brucker first spoke of the decline in the Army's operational capabilities which would result from significant reductions in money available to the Army. He illustrated his point with charts | an 4 chart indicating how under the FY 1959 Budget the Army's rate of modernization would decline, In his summary Secretary Brucker strongly recommended a reversal of the trends portrayed by the above-mentioned charts and asked for supplementary resources for the Army in FY 1958 and additional appropri- e ations in FY 1959. He indicated a strong conviction that we should retain our present NATO and Korean deployments. . The Army also recommended “6- : REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT, D. BISENHQWER LIBRARY ~> entitled "Ihe Decline of Available Money FY 1958-FY 1959" and a second TOP SERRE 7 Te. eA, Aa att i a TE ne eehe ee tea '