Wersgail Nevertheless. the AEC declared that Bikini was safe. ‘‘There is virtually no radiation left.'" one AEC official stated in 1969, ‘and we can find no discernible effect on plant or animal life.” A Complete Fatlure In 1969 the first Bikinians returned to their atoll co assist in the resettlement project. The Department of the Interior (DOI) began construction on 40 homes. Bikini Island and Eneu, a nearbyisland. were bulldozed, and the topsoil was turned over to reduce radia- tion. By the end of the year. 50,000 new trees were planted on the islands. All signs poinred to a happy ending for the Bikinians. In 1971 the director of the AEC’s Division of Operational Safety reported that numerous well water samples had been taken from several locations on Bikini Island and thar. ‘‘from a radiological viewpoint, the water is safe to drink.’’ In late 1973 the United States announced chat construction on Bikini was nearly complete. and that “‘if all is acceptable to the people. the trust terntory government is prepared to allow chem toreturn to Bikini Atoll permanently by Christ- mas this year.”’ Rogers C. B. Morton, alarmed by thefindings of routine,unsophisticated radiological surveys, halted construction on Bikini Island. He wrote to Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger several months later. in March TO 1975, to requese that a thorough survey be conducted on Bikini, warning that ‘‘despite assurances that the atoll is safe. che attitudes and fears of the people are being influenced by various outside groups, many of whom are critics of the nuclear program."’ In order to ‘avoid ... the loss of our credibility” with the Bikinians, Morton concluded, ‘‘we must answer the critics.” The Interior Departmenc needed the Defense Department's (DOD) logistical support for the survey. for neither Intertor nor the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA}—successor to the AEC and precursor to the Department of Energy (DOE}—had the logistical capability or the money to conduct the survey. But although Morton's letter said that ERDA was prepared to conduct a radiological survey in April. DOD did not even respond until the end of May, when it stated that it could conduct the survey ata ‘“‘reimbursable cost’’ of $609.000. Since Interior had no funds for reim- As the Bikinians began to return to their bursement, Defense declined to take on the more thorough, radiological survey of Bikini was needed. In 1972 the AEC had made such a survey of Enewetak, a Marshallese atoll also used as a nuclear test site. Instruments DO! tried again in June. Incerior bluntly stated in a letter thar it was ‘‘deeply concerned that a quality radiological survey such as that performed on Enewetak. whose people atoll, however, DOI recognized that a new. used in the Enewetak survey. such as airborne sensors, were far more sensitive and accurate than the equipment used to conduct the 1967 survey of Bikini. The Enewetak survey was the starting point of a massive cleanup by the U.S. government. and most of the Enewetakese now are being resettled in the southern part of their atoll, which was left relatively free of contamination by the tests. A debate task. will not be coming back forsome time, cannot be made available in a timely fashion for the Bikinians whose return is imminent.'’ Warning that ‘‘none of the involved departments has budgeted adequately for this needed and highly warranted effore in order to meet our statutory and moral commitmentsto the people of this area."’ the letter concluded that the United States required “‘a strong reaffirmation by all concerned agencies to work together in carrying out a comprehensive program.”’ But simmers, however, over whether to permit resettlement of Enjebi, an island in the north whose radiation levels exceed federal standards. In late 1974, Secretary of the Interior Meanwhile, some Bikinians had expressed a desire to build homesin the interior of the 86. 87. no survey was conducted.