Certain scientific, technical, and operational per-
sonnel of TG 7.1 were authorized in writing
and to the zero points, both ashore and afloat.
There were no security infractions associated
with controlling access to these areas; however,
in several instances the mechanics of control
were seriously in danger of compromise as a result of the failure of some scientific personnel at
zero locations to cooperate with the access controls. This situation was intensified by a lack of
adequate numbers of experienced security per-
to transport intra-atoll, in their personal cus-
tody, Categories II and IIT materials.
sonnel to provide frequent field reconnaissance.
Agreements reached betwen TG’s 7.1 and 7.5
later corrected this situation.
7.9
7.14
Due to the delay in the acquisition of
PAC funds and the shortage of stock-
piled construction materials, required physical
security installations, such as replacement perimeter fences for the Administration Compound
and the CMR area, Site Elmer; guard shacks;
and pertinent communications, were completed
at a critically late date. In some instances, emer-
gency measures had to be adopted to provide
suitable protection for classified materials and
documents which arrived at EPG prior to the
completion of the physical security plant.
7.10
The number of “travel control” points
was reduced during this Operation. There-
fore, numerous <igns pointing out security areas
and badge requirements were posted. Military
and H&N guard patrols were utilized to enforce
access to such areas: these guards also made
periodic checks to see that required badges were
worn.
7.11
The HARDTACK -ecurity badge system
became operationa: on 15 March 1958.
During the Operation, a total of 20,995 badges
was issued to all participants. This figure included regular. special, and exchange badges and
replacements for broken or lost badges. The
badge system, as described in SOP 205-6, required minor modifications to change the de-
sign of the Official Observer badge and to provide several new badge types to identify
observers from the United Kingdom, NATO, and
the United Nations. Color layouts depicting the
security badge svstem were made available to
Headquarters, JTF-Seven. and all Task Groups
for orientation and information purposes.
A record of security infractions incurred by
personnel of TG’s 7.1 and 7.5 was maintained. In each case, the individual responsible
was properly cautioned, and steps were taken to
prevent recurrences. A total of 44 security in-
fractions were committed by personnel of TG 7.1.
Thirteen of the 44 security infractions weve committed by military personnel assigned to TG 7.1.
Twenty-four infractions were committed by personnel of TG 7.5, of which 23 were by H&N
personnel and 1 by AEC. There were no security
violations committed by personnel of TG 7.1 or
7.5, as defined by AEC regulations.
7.15
An extensive locally-designed security°
poster program was initiated by the HEN
security organization. These posters, suitable for
indoor or outdoor use, were placed at strategic
locations and were relocated at frequent intervals on a firm schedule. Color slides of some of
these posters were also shown periodically at the
movies operated by H&N.
7.16
Emergency burn-barrels and burn-boxes
were fabricated and supplied for use as
required by Headquarters, JTF-Seven, for elements of TG’s 7.1 and 7.5. New incinerators of
advance design were provided in the adminis-
tration compounds on Sites Elmer and Nan for
routine destruction of classified waste and documents.
7.17
The H&N security organization, in conjunction with TG 7.1 and the AEC of-
fices, compiled and coordinated with the Military
Police a location list of all safe files utilized by
TG 7.1 and the AEC offices for the storage of
classified documents and materials. During non-
A total of 185 HARDTACK security
badges were reported as lost and not recovered. constituting a loss percentage of 0.009.
Persons reporting their badge as lost were requird to execute a “Lost Security Badge
Statement.”
working and lunch periods, the MP's made se-
7.18
maximum security controls for access to
at the EPG were several from LASL,
maintained in the custody of Dr. W. E. Ogle,
CMRarea at Site Elmer. Comparison cards con-
Secret” teletypes were sent from DMA, AEC,
Washington, to General Luedecke, the senior
7.12
Exchange badges were used to ensure
exclusion areas. such as the assembly areas and
barge slips at Sites Elmer and Nan and the
taining photos were utilized to control access to
curity checks of the respositories and adjacent
unattended office areas. Records were also kept
of HEN classified repositories which were similar-
ly checked by H&N guards.
7.18
The only AEC “Top Secret’? documents
cientific Deputy, JTF-Seven.
Several ‘Top
AEC representative: however, they were subsequently downgraded to ‘‘Secret.”
om
storage bunkers for test devices and components
rT FeO HO HR OO re
Seven. Upon arrival at the EPG, custody of
these materials was assumed by the CTG 7.5.
Military Guards were utilized to safeguard
movements of such materials outside guarded
security areas. AEC couriers accompanied al}
intra-atoll movements and inter-atoll air shipments of Category I materials. Inter-atoll surface shipments were in the custody of CTG 7.3.
A
on Ay ay
PART Il, CHAPTER 7
GUNTIDEN
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