bd
a7.
samplers should participate whenever possible, but that one would be
acceptable should the shot interval be less than seven days.
He also
stated that if necessary the B-36 effects aircraft could be eliminated
on all shots except YANKEE and NECTAR.*
During this, the BRAVO-ROMEO
interim, planning got underway on the roll-up, the final report and
the Eniwetok Five-Year Plan.
The successful air operation was due partly to a calculated risk
taken by General Estes.
Basing his decision upon a thorough study of
radiological and weather forecast analysis, General Estes decided that
an announced postponement would in reality be longer than the twenty-
four to forty=edght how period offiodlally announced,
Thia theory
involved a certain amount of calculated, but obvicusly necessary, riek. .
Each day, Weather Central at Eniwetok gave the same weather briefing
to General Clarkson and General Estes.
However, General Eates looked
at the projected weather one day ahead.
While General Clarkson was con-
sidering the next day as D-day, General Estes was considering the next
day as D-day and D plus 1,
If the trend looked unfavorable for D and
D plus 1, General Estes then considered that he was in Dminus 3 and
directed his commanders to fly their aircraft and still have two days
for inspection and maintenance.
If D and D plus 1 looked favorable, he
cautioned his commanders not to fly their aircraft.
While this proce-
dure permitted the line and flight crews to do the best possible maintenance Job of keeping aircraft in a quality maintenance condition, it
placed the Air Task Group in an awkward position should a rapid unforecasted change in the weather suddenly place everyone in D minus l.
‘
2
ot
+
.
.
‘
“
\
.
.
Tho
.
'
m4
wore
al
*The B-36 effects aircraftwasflown on all missions.
ta
AFWL/HO
wae
peed
o
roo
qu.
es.
OF