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operational missiles even if they were not as good quality as we
:
could wish.
i
The Vice President believed that if these hearings
i
brought out the point that we had the capability to put a squadron
of IRBM's in Europe by the end of Calendar 1958, even if these
missiles were not fully proved out, there would be strong Congressional
pressure to take the risk and place the squadron in Europe for psychological reasons.
Secretary McElroy expressed his general agreement with the Vice
President's comment but pointed out that there was a difference between putting squadrons in the United Kingdom and in NATO.
would be in the United Kingdom late in Calendar Year 1958.
IRBM's
Secretary Dulles expressed doubt whether the NATO nations in
Western Europe would actually be ready to receive IRBM's prior to
Mid-1959. Accordingly, he would counsel against accelerating this
program in order to be able to send an imperfect IRBM to NATO before
our European Allies were ready to use it. Secretary Douglas of the
Air Force indicated that our IRBM program vis-a-vis the United Kingdom
contemplated that the first IRBM squadron in the United Kingdon would
be U.S.-manned.
;
The Vice President repeated that from information and rumor available to him, he judged that there would be heavy Congressional pressure
to go ahead on a crash program to achieve operational IRBM's by the end
of Calendar Year 1958. With a smile the President asked the Vice President which of the two parties was likely to propose a big tax increase
in order to mount a crash program. The President indicated, however,
that he had no objection to going forward with this program for the
United Kingdom. Secretary McElroy added a warning that there would be
need for additional money if this acceleration of the IRBM prograi was
decided on.
Director Brundage asked several questions, notably about the
possibility that Congress might decide to cut out Defense Department
carry-over funds, about another attack carrier, and about the possibility
of saving money by slowing up the process of promotion in the armed
forces. This last suggestion produced a brief discussion of the recom-
mendations of the Cordiner Report.
Secretary Quarles and Secretary
Douglas expressed the opinion that implementation of the Cordiner Report
would ultimately result in a savings but not in the first year.
.
Mr. Brundage then inquired whether the FY 1959 Defense Department
;
Program contemplated restricting construction to the high priority
4
to close down some military installations.
needs of the Department of Defense and further whether it was possible
Secretary McElroy replied that the Defense Department did indeed
hope to find some military facilities which could be closed down.
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