-3previous.
In reading further it seems that these questions may in part be
based on the problems with the interrelationship between the complex DOD systems
and the AEC devices that must be carried.
This may have something to do with
the "wooden" bomb concept which was to simplify the early design to take into
account the relationship between the carrier and the device and not incur the
cost or run into problems at the end of the line.
Here is a 2 Sept. 1960 memo from Hertford to all of the various
manufacturers associated with the production of weapons under Albuquerque as
well as various AEC geolgraphical offices that are affected by Albuquerque's
weapons production and it begins, "By about the middle of Sept., ALOO expects
to receive from DMA a revised production directive that will materially increase
the fiscal year 62 production effort across the board.
In terms of numbers of
units to war reserve the increase is more than 30% above quantities called out
for FY 62 in present schedules."
He also notes that to "prime the pipeline"
there will be a substantial increase in FY 61 costs, and this workload and costs
will not be uniformly distributed around the system.
I mention this step-up
because it might be significant but I don’t know the reason for it or the basis
behind the DMA decision.
Note that this was about 1 year after a 24 July 59 message from Hertford
to the various AEC offices and branch offices under it on the subject of guidance
from DMA on production requirements.
As of that time they were waiting direction
from DMA and were apparently cutting down the effort and asking the total personnel
be kept at no greater than the present level with no overtime authorized.
Therefore, it might be that from the summer of 59 through the summer of 60 the
weapons production output decreased and therefore this effort in Sept. and Oct.
of 60 might be to step the production back up.