7.3 the uvavy, from tue 7.4 tne Air rorce, and 7.5 the contractors (primarily firm of Lolmes and sarver) and Leoartment of Defense peonle. Tne Joint Task Force concept vas one originated for the Able and saker tests at Bikini «toll in ly4o0 and was continued tnereafter. [t had been proven the most effective and efficient way of combinine tecnnical KnOw-now, military and security interests and an equitaole sharing of the knowledze resulting from sucau tests. Task torce Conmander, Upon the shoulders of the and tue neads of the five segments of the Force rested tie responsibility for tue safety of all personnel and che successful execution of the tests. Sometime in tne _-arly morning hours of ilaren Ll, 1954, taformation was received concerning the status of tne snips, personnel and security surrounding 5U,00U square mile zone waicii extended from 10° 15' to 12° 45' north latitude and from 160° 35' to luo? 16' east longitude. Also received was meteorological information concerning wind ana weatuer conditions. After all data vas received and evaluated, the decisiou was made to go anead with the first test of tue ‘Castle’ series. ‘tie code name for the sleeping giant bottled up in its steel and concrete wonv was "Bravo." At one minute, or even a few seconds before 06:45 hilo (local) time on ware 1, 1954, tne tragic events which would follow 'Bravo's" detonation could nave been prevented, but incredibly, the decision vas wade to go aiead, despite an incomplete and somewnat alarming report concerning tne winds avove uikini.* for '.fike’ snot on inewetok in 1952 available wind information shoved winds heading to the vest from sea * bee appendix for igs “slike uw and Bravo" wind direction charts. 7 10146 1b