statistical significance, of time, effects are expected to be "minimal" over a long period and exposures are referred to as “sublethal” rather than near lethal. It is to the credit of the reports that at least the later data disproved most of these minimizing statements, even though the language tends to indicate a conservative, minimizing approach to findings. mere game of semantics. Some people may see this as a The Committee, however, would prefer to say that it is not particularly concerned with the choice of words themselves and their connotations, but rather the psychological or scientific "set" of mind which they imply. The Committee is of the impression that there are two possible reasons for this tendency, which are discussed below. The AEC Report, AEC-Brookhaven Relationship As mentioned before, order to be reassuring. the AEC has tended to understate events or facts in No doubt this is partly due to the habit of the news media seizing upon the outstanding or interesting aspect of an event. "newsworthy" events are usually negative in nature because interested in what is going well but what has gone wrong. Most most people are not The Bravo event occurred at a time when the public at large was anxious over the development of nuclear weapons and their psychological and real advantages in the post World War II "cold war." The event of March 1, 1954, and the later furor it caused in Japan most certainly had its reverberations in the United States. Whether it is justified or not, it is easy to see why the AEC would want to be "reassuring." It is also easy to see why early reports of the conditions of the Marshallese also tended to "minimize" the effects of fallout, One has only to note that the first major report dealing with the event was published by the Atomic Energy Commission. This report set the tone followed in later reports. 143 [O14 TSI