TOP SECRE'
Secretary Quarles commented that it seemed to him that in
the matter, first, of preparing our claims, it would be advantageous
to haye them ready to proclaim even though we made no claim. Everybody seemed to agree on the wisdom of making this preparation. It
also seemed to Secretary Quarles that everyone was in agreement that
it would be fine if we could exclude the USSR from any voice in the
administration of Antarctica, but we also agree that we can't do it.
So we will have to assume that we will work with the Soviets. In
terms of procedure, the plan set forth in this paper seemed excellent--that is, we begin negotiations with friendly claimant powers
and, after reaching agreement with them, we approach the Soviets.
Tf this procedure was practical enough, Secretary Quarles doubted
very much whether the terms that we would offer to the Soviets were
realistic and likely to be accepted by them. If this is the case,
we would find ourselves pretty well insulated from the fear of the
Joint Thiefs of Staff that the Soviets would gain a voice in the administration of Antarctica. Nevertheless, Secretary Quarles counseled earnestly the wisdom of not seeking any agreement with the
Soviets that was not an enforcible agreement. We must plan to enforce any agreement we enter into. This will prove expensive, and
the expense will fall largely on the United States.
With respect to Secretary Quarles’ last point, Secretary
Dulles observed that everyone agreed that there was no likelihood
in the immediate future for the use of Antarctica for military purposes. But, as in the case of Alaska, which nobody thought of much
advantage when we bought it, Antarctica may ultimately prove to have
a considerable military usefulmess. Accordingly, if we are to be
involved in expenses in the area, such expenses will fall upon us
perhaps 25 years from now, but certainly not in the near future.
General Cutler summarized for the Council the arguments
which had arisen in the Planning Board with respect to the precise
relation of the joint administrative body to the United Nations.
He gave his own view that it would be highly advantageous, particularly from a propaganda angle, if the administration of Antarctica
could be worked out in the UN and made subordinate to the UN. For
this reason, the phraseology with respect to the relation between
the joint administration and the UN has been made sufficiently flexible to apply to a number of possible situations.
Se
cand
% :
Py
‘
.
tough inspection problem if and when the agreement was achieved
and the joint administration set up.
v0
:
e
f
os
:
B
—_
,
|
a ;
e.
q
:
1
x
¢
x
7
8
a
-g
Kr
a
ade |
ie
am.
te
}
force the agreement, not years before we propose to enforce the
agreement.
The President observed that we would encounter a very
- soa
te a
;o
Secretary Quarles commented that it seemed to him that the
time to conclude the agreement was the time when we propose to en-
The National Security Council:
-k-
-
.
TOP SECRET