Becauseliving conditions deteriorated further the United States instituted small trust funds. For the Bikinians, the trust fund yielded semi-annual interest payments of approximately $15 per person. lier showed a marked increase in the were 5 to 6 times higher than examount uf radioacuve nuclides in the pected. people y bodies. These tests show that tne Bikinians were ingesting Throughout the rehabilitation of higher thun acceptable concentratlons of cancer-causing radiation from the water und from food grown in the island’s contaminated soil. The U.S. government then began importing all food (except localfish. Which was declared safe) and donk to Bikini. This food program has compounded the Bikini dilemma: while the Bikinians have been told that the island is radioactive and po- tentiaily dangerous. the prospect of free food and housing and a chance to move from Kili—called the “prison bv residents—has encouraged peuple to returm. In euriv 1978. the Enerey Re- search and Development Association considered moving the people to another island in Bikini Aroll— Eneu-——ind was growing fruits and Vegetadies In an experimental garden to test radioactivity levels there. Results from these experiments. how- ever, werent expected for about a year. According to a careful report in the Los Angeles Times. by February 1978 it was official government policy: Bikini was unfit for people to live on. Nevertheless. in Apnil. Trust Territory officials, testifying at a Bikini. the Energy Research and Development Association and the Department of Energy had con- may de the only global source of data agencies treatment of the Marshal- tion is thought to contribute the change. From the nuclear bomb tests at on humans where intake via ingesmajor fraction of plutonium body burden. A 1976 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory scientist stated that Bikini “is posstbly the best available source of data for evaluating the transfer of piutonium across the gut wall after being incorporated into biological systems. Government scientists vehemently deny they have used the Marshallese for expenmentation. A DOE official explained. “It was done by technical tvpes anxious to know about the transfer of radioactive elements.” Intenor Department officials an- nounced in Mav 1978 that the atoll would be evacuated within 90 days. re-estaolishing the Bikinitans on could remain on Bikini without harm unul the expenments on Eneu were reminiscent of the 1946 removal. “There are some things we didn't Eneu [sland, insisted that the people completed tn January 1979—provided that thev didn't eat any: coconuts, and that the coming medical tests showed. as was expected, no large tncreases in internal radiation levels. In the April 1978 medical examinations. however, the Bikinians’ internal radiation levels ranged up to 0.980. or nearly tice the U.S. maximum safety standard of 0.5 rems. At the same time. the pre- liminary results from the experimental garden at Eneu Island showed that radioactivity levels many of whom have now retumed to their home atoll to work with vews of the island—-many of which thousands of U.S. army soldiers in suggest the Bikinians were unwitting the massive nuclear debns cleanup. subjects for scientific radiation tests. Until the scientific community and A recent study forthe Department of independent orgamzations begin cntEnergy concluded that ©’ Bikini toll ically to monitor U.S. government ducted countless radiological sur- and the people returned to Kili Island. [n late August, Interior representatives went to Bikini to super- congressional hearing on tunding for suffered radiation exposure until they returned to their radioactive island atter 25 years. Now the Bikimians are an exposed population. too. And who knows what the future holds for the Enewetak people— vise the evacuation, in many ways feel good about,” said Taro Lokebal, who serves as liaison be- tween the Bikini Council and the United States. “"The (U.S.) High Commissioner made the people rush. ... Some things were left behind—pigs. chickens, lumber. We had to have our ceremony on the ship. It was supposed to be on the shore but we had no time.” Though the Bikintans. like the Enewetakese. suffered the devastating physical and psvchologicalef- lese. their Situation is not apt to Bikini and Enewetak to the medical treatment of the irradiated islanders. the 30 years of American trusteeship has brought the Marshallese anvthing but the conditions promised tn the U.N. trust agreement.© Conard. Robert A.. M.D.. et al.. A Twean Year Reviewof Medical Findings in a Mar- shutlese Population Accidentaliv Exposed to Rudivactive Fullout. Brookhaven Nattonal Laboratory. Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce. 1975. available from National Technical [nformation Service. Congress of Micronesia Special Joint Cummittee Concerning Rongelap and Ctirtk: 1973 Report. Koloma. Ponape 96941: The Congress. Detrou Free Press. Sept. 2. 1978. Gensutkin (Japan) Medical Survey Team. Reportion the tavestieation of Damage Dune &v the Bikini Hvdreven Bomb Test to the Peupie of the Marshall tsiands. rev. ed.: Tokyo. Japan: Gensutkin, 4th A.. Akimoto Bldg.. 2-19 Tsukasa-Che. Kanda. Chiyoda-ku. Tokyo. 1973. Honolulu Advertiser, Oct. 10. 1978: June [6. 20. TI. and 22, 1977. March 19, 1978: July 30. 1978. International Herald Tribune. Apnil i9. 1978, Kiste. Robert C. The Sikinians: A Study in Forced Migration. Menio Park, Ca.: Cummings Publishing Co.. 1974. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Dose Assessment at Bikini Atoll. UCRL-51879 Pr, Washington. D.C.: Department of Commerce. June, 3. 1977. available from National Technical [nformazion Service. Los Angeles Times. June I!, 1977. McHenry. Donaid F. Micronesia; Truss Betraved. Washington, D.C.: Camegie Endowment for Internation: Peace. 1978. Micronesian Independent. Sept. [2. (975, New York Times. March 23. [978. fects of relocation and, at times.- Washington Post. March 23 and 27, even near starvation, they had never Aprit 3. 1978. February 1979 1978; The Bulletin 15