was recommended for TRU contamination only. The soil levels recommended
were associated with 10 percent to 100 percent of the ICRP lung values for

individuals. Enjebi Island was to be cleaned up for TRU but not resettled
at this time due to high fission product doses. Runit, the island for
disposal of contaminated soil and debris, was to remain quarantined.

From the outset, the task group's recommendations were the subject of
controversy. Qn occasion, a strong technical defense of their validity was

needed. Agreement on the final draft criteria was a fragile product. Some
NV staff did not support the recommendations. DONA staff preferred to
establish their own cleanup criteria. EPA staff agreed that they would not
disagree, but were looking toward developing their own TRU cleanup criteria.
The Enewetak people and their legal council sought cleanup that would
achieve zero risk for their return. The task group's recommendations were
the subject of an AEC staff paper that was approved by the Commission.
The remaining figures identify agency responsibilities, the task group
members, the basis for their judgments and recommendations, options
considered, their conclusions, the position taken on risk, the features of

the EIS related to Task Group recommendations, and some of the obvious

differences between the Enewetak criteria and current EPA draft dose limits.

The role of those who performed the early work to develop Enewetak cleanup
criteria largely ended with the issuance of the task group's report.

Cleanup planning, field operations, and participants were documented in DOE

and DNA reports. However, no overall post-mortem evaluation of this project
has been conducted and little effort made to learn from all aspects of this
unique experience. So far as I know, this meeting is the first time that
the Enewetak project has been reviewed since DOE's report on field
operations was issued.
In that context I would like to acknowledge the

important contributions made toward the success of this effort by the task

group members and particularly Walter Nervik of LLNL.

Jack Healy of LANL

and Lyn Anspaugh of LLNL provided the critical relationship between TRU soil

concentrations, air concentrations, and dose to lung. Harold Beck and Jim
McLaughlin of HASL, Paul Gudiksen of LLNL, and Oliver Lynch of NVO provided

input for external doses.

Vic Nelson of the University of Washington and

Vic Noshkin of LLNL provided marine data. Bill Robinson of LLNL provided
the many dose estimates needed for a matrix of land use and cleanup


The reason for citing these contributions is to emphasize that development
of site-specific criteria and options for cleanup of a contaminated
environment requires a large amount of detailed environmental information

that has been evaluated for use in cleanup planning.

Mandatory cleanup dose

limits derived from extremely low risk values such as those in the EPA
draft, had they been in existence in 1973, may well have made Enewetak

cleanup appear to be an impossible task with a price tag that was out of the

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