Chapter #—Monitoring Accidental Radtatton Releases * 65 it has reached outside the borders of the test site) by the EPA offsite monitoring system. Estimates of whether a particular release will be detected offsite are made by the Department of Energy or the sponsoring laboratory. Such judg- ments, however, are not always correct. During the drill-back operations of the Glencoe test in 1986, minor levels of radioactive material were detected offsite contrary to expectations. During the Riola test in 1980, minor amounts of radioactive inert gases were detected offsite. In both cases, DOE personnel did not anticipate the release to be detected offsite and therefore did not notify EPA."! Although the releases were extremely minor and well-monitored within the test site by DOE, EPA was not aware of the release until the material had crossed the test site boundaries. Both cases fueled concem over DOE's willingness to announce accidents at the test site. The failure of DOE to publicly announceall releases, regardless of size or circumstance, contributes to public concerns over the secrecy of the testing program and reinforces the perceptions that all the dangersofthe testing program are not being openly disclosed. Onsite Monitoring by the Department of Energy The Department of Energy has responsibility for monitoring within the boundaries of the Nevada Test Site to evaluate the containment of radioactivity onsite and to assess doses-to-man from radioactive releases as a result of DOE operations. To achieve these objectives, DOE uses a comprehensive monitoring system that includes both real-time monitoring equipment and sample recovery equipment. The real-time monitoring system is used for prompt detection following a test, the sample recovery equipmentis used to assess long-term dose andrisk. The heart of the real-time monitoring system is a network of Remote Area Monitors (RAMs). Forall tests, RAMsare arranged in an array aroundthetest hole (figure 4-5). Radiation detectors are also frequently installed down the stemming column so the flow of radioactive material up the emplacement hole can be monitored. In tunnel shots, there are RAMsabove the shot point, throughout the tunnel complex, outside the tunnel entrance, and in each containment vessel (figure 4-6). In addition to RAMspositioned for each shot. a permanent RAM network with stations throughout the test site is in continual operation. During eachtest, a helicopter with closed-circuit television circles the ground zero location. Nearby. a second helicopter and an airplane are prepared to track any release that might occur. A third helicopter and an airplane remain on stand-by should they be needed. In addition, a team (called the ** Bluebird Team'"), consisting of trained personnel in 2 fourwheeldrive vehicles outfitted with detection equip-~ ment and personnel protection gear is stationed near the projected fallout area to track and monitor any release. Approximately 50 radiation monitonng personne] are available on the NevadaTest Site to make measurements of exposure rates and collect samples for laboratory analysis should they be needed. Prior to the test, portions of thetest site are evacuated unless the Operation requires manned stations. If manned Stations are required, direct communication links are established with the workers and evacuation routes are set-up. In addition to the real-time monitoring network, air and water samples are collected throughout the Test Site and analyzed at regular intervals. This comprehensive environmental monitoring program is summarized in table 4-2. The network of samplers located throughout the Test Site includes 160 thermoluminescent dosimeters; over 40 air samplers that collect samples for analysis of radioiodines. gross beta, and plutonium-239. and about half a dozen noble gas samplers. Each year over 4.500 samples are collected and analyzed for radiological measurement and characterization of the Nevada Test Site. All sample collection. preparation, analysis, and review are performed by the staff of the Laboratory Operations Section of REECO’s Environmental Sciences Department. In the case of a prompt, massive accidental release of radioactive material, the following emergency procedures would beinitiated: 1, any remaining test site employees downwind of the release would be evacuated, 2. monitoring teams and radiological experts would be dispatched to offsite downwind areas, ‘Vin the case of Riola, the release occurred in the evening and was notreported unul the following morning.As a result. it was 12!/2 hours before EPA was noufied.