Chapter 3—Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions @ 55 dence’ translates into a chance of | in 100, | in 1,000, or 1 in 1,000,000, requires a decision about whatis an acceptable risk level. In turn, decisions of acceptable risk level can only be made by weighing . the costs of an unintentional release against the benefits of testing. Consequently, those who feel thattesting is important for our national security will accept greater risk, and those who oppose nuclear testing will find even small risks unacceptable. Establishing an acceptable level ofrisk is difficult not only because of value judgments associated with nuclear testing, but also because the risk is not seen as voluntary to those outside the testing program. Muchhigherrisks associated with voluntary, everyday activities may be acceptable even though the much lowerrisks associated with the nuclear test site may still be considered unacceptable. The question of whether the testing program is “safe enough’’ will ultimately remain a value judgment that weighs the importance of testing against the risk to health and environment. In this sense, concern about safety will continue, largely fueled by concern about the nuclear testing program itself. However, given the continuanceoftesting and the acceptance of the associated environmental damage,the questionof ‘‘adequate safety’’ becomes replaced with the less subjective question of whether any improvements can be made to reduce the chances of an accidental release. In this regard, no areas for improvement have been identified. This is not to say that future improvements will not be made aS experience increases, but only that essentially alk suggestions that increase the safety margin have been implemented. The safeguards built into each test makethe chances of an accidental release of radioactive material as remote as possible.