Chapter l—f£xecutive Summary « 7 The acceptability of the remaining risk will depend on public confidence in the nuclear testing program. This confidence currently suf- the occurrenceoftests, the justification for such of Energy emanating from problemsat nuclear weapons production facilities and from radiation hazards associated with the past atmospheric testing program.In the case of the present underground nuclear testing program, this mistrust is exacerbated by DOE’s reluctance to disclose information concerning the testing program, and by the knowledge that notall tests releasing radioactive material to the atmosphere tion have been successfully demonstrated by the fers from a lack of confidence in the Department (whatever the amount or circumstances) are announced. As the secrecy associated with the testing program is largely ineffective in preventing the dissemination of information concerning secrecy is questionable.’ The benefits ofpublic dissemination of informa- EPAin the area ofradiation monitoring. Openly available community monitoring stations allow residents near the test site to independently verify information released by the government, thereby providing reassurance to the community at large. In a similar manner, public concern over the testing program could be greativ mitigated if a policy were adopted whereby all tests are announced, or at least all tests that release radioactive material to the atmosphere (whatever the conditions) are announced. 5See for example: Riley R. Geary, “‘Nevada Test Site's dirty little secrets,"’ Budletin of the Atomic Scientists. April 1989, pp. 35-38.