157 SESSION It IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE POLICIES TAYLOR: I would like to point out what I think is a deeply significant difference b:tween a psychological rraction of the Marshall Istacders and people, particularly in the United States, who might become involved in even a limited sort of nuclear war. To the Marshallese apparently this was some kind of fairly im urtant but not overwhelming catastrophe which just suddenly happened. We have conditioned ourselves as a country for twenty years nowto a state of mind that says when nuclear war breaks ont, all is lost. The whole idea of massive deterrence is built around the idea—it was built around the concept of making the war as bad as possible and therefore avoiding it. [ think it's really clear from many things that have happened ond many things that haven't happened, that it's our national policy noi to accept as a working premise any kind of a nuclear war. FREMONT-SMITH: That's right. TAYLOR: Therefore, if it does happen, eve. in 3s imited way, it seems to me there's going ta be a very deep paychological fact of life that will lead to a reaction to disaster which would se very different from the characteristic human reaciion to disaster: that is, to rise to .he occasion and do the best that one can. There will be a feeling of hopelessness that we have built up very carefully and thoroughly and almost studiously over many, many years. AYRES: [could add to that. A lot of civil defense planning is predicated on the assumption that people will cooperate with aywncies of the gcvernment and with its appointed representatives in an emergency. Yet privately [ worry that if a nuclear war occurs, because of this conditioning that you speak of, one possible reaction is a great intensification of the kir¢ of distrust that we've been talking about. ‘They really did us in this time. Now we can't believe a word they aay. Lynch them, hang them from the nearest lamp-post. "“on't follow directions. They're just leading us down a garden path." MILLET: I'm interested in this apparent preoccupation with the anti-missile defense which seems to be one of the things we are struggling with Russia about most of all right now, with the possible exception of Vietnam.