140 DASA 2019-2 FREMONT-SMITH: So the assumption is if you neglect it,you don't recover from the damage. EISENBUD: [ think we should bear in mind that through a process of testing we have disseminated around the world a very sizable fraction of the total amount that would be produced in an all-out nuclear war. Hasn't there been about 500 megatons of iesting? Let's say in nuclear war you tz'k about 10,000. Now you've got a good tracer exQeriment. You see, you're up to maybe somewhere between | and 10 percent of what would be released. If you increase the present level _ a hundredfold without creating a risk it would be significant compared to the social consequences of the bombings themselves in the immediacy. AYRES: That's just a few hundred megatons over a decade although most of it was concentrated over 3 or 4 years. EISENBUD: DUNHAM: What's the difference? It's all long-lived stuff. We're talking about the late effect. EISENBUD: It doesn't matter. It's undistributed. AYRES: Yes, but the uptake phenomenon very much depends on the timing here. EISENBUD: For strontium-90? AYRES: Uptake efficiency is much smaller for strontium-90 in the soil, compared to uptake of strontium-90 fromfoliage. If you nave a lot in the atmosphere at one time you may get quite a considerable dose and, of course, it's stored in the bone. EISENBUD: Asal say, it can increase about 100. You take the social consequences of the bombing themselves and the immediate conscquenccs and compare that with the worldwide consequences of, let's say for the sake of argument, everybody having 500 picocuries of calcium. I would say that the late effects would be a minor thing. TAYLOR: There's still one other case and that is when you consider strontium-90 in the region where there was heavy fallout but the people were protected, let's say, by fallout shelters. The question is, what is the remaining hazard then” Let's say people are out of their shelters after a month. [don't know. I'm really asking. Is it clear that