. 4218 3.3.2 DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS The pop syiten fer planning the suppert ef everseas miolear tests makes 4t necessary to sutmit requirements long before the shot schedule is in any way firm. Therefore, these early estimates are larv2iy coverned by the experience gained from the pasteperation tallore? to suit whatever is already know abeut the coming operation. Se far it has proved safe to assume that each eperation would be larger and more complex than its predecessor. Since the underwater and high altitude shots, as shown in the preceding section, were decided on shortly after the conclusion of Redwing, it was evident from the beginning ef Hardtack planning that these shots would require a very substantial amount of support in addition te that normelly provided. . On October 29, 1956 representatives of the J-3 Section, Joint Task Force SEVEN, visited CTG 7.1 at Los Alamos te discuss Hardt-ck support requirenents, stating that CJTF SEVEN needed these requirenents at the earliest possible dete. 7.1 estimates at tat time are show in column 2 of Table 3.4 which lists, except for motor vehicles, the principal items of military support of both direct and indirect interest to 7G 7.1. No distinction is drawn in the table between itens of direct interest to TG 7.1, such as a comand and firing ship and effects ships and aircraft, and items resulting from TO 7.1's require= ments for services, such as base facilities, transportation and eommnications, which generate material requirenents in the task groups which provide those services, t CJTF SEVEN held a logistics and construction conference on February 19 ani @ planning conference on February 20, 1957. UpDUR re The first conference dis- %7