aa
3-29
operations 4t would be well to clearly define who or what agency
is responsible for the calculating of predictions.
LFit is to
be the J-3 Section, assurance must be had that a qualified
atomic weapons staff officer be included in the section.
Operations at Johnston Island took on @ very different
complexton from those at Eniwetok, and Bikini in particular, -as
&@-result of a drastic change in command relationships.
-Fremthe
task group.and-project level, NEWSREEL appeared to be more of a
military operation than the usual scientific endeavor.
This was
caused by a decisiontogo “austere", the confined area of operations including an emergency air base, and the assumption by the
Task Force staff of many of the details of operations which had
formerly been handled at task unit or project and never higher
than task group leve1.additional problems came about early in
the operational phase by a division of the final planning effortpart being done at Eniwetok while the major part was being undertaken at Johnston.
Once the entire Task Force closed in, this
problem ceased and important decisions became more readily
available.
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