TOP SECRE' we Na : nee eee i because he had suggested this some time ago. He had made the point that we should not approve components of production models unless we were gure the missiles would work. Secretary Wilson said that the United States had a "mess" of JUPITER and THOR missiles. The President said these missiles wouldn't be a mess if they worked. Secretary Wilson said we had a missile that went 1500 miles, but it had no guidance and the re~entry problem was not solved. He seid we had two versions of an ICEM, one a year behind the other. We were replacing the first before we were sure it would work. Secretary Wilson thought that if ATLAS did not work, neither would TITAN. The President said he agreed with what Secretary Wilson wis proposing. With reference to overtime, the President thought the real bottleneck in missile programs was not overtime, but thinking out the problems. Mr. Dulles said that he had no evidence of new or dramatic in the Soviet missiles program. The President said he thought Secretary Wilson's plan was satisfactory. Mr. Cutler said he understood that ATLAS was continued at the highest priority, and that the priority of TITAN was reduced. Secretary Wilson asked whether Admiral Strauss agreed with the recommendations in his letter, and Admixml Strauss replied in the affirmative. The National Security Council: Noted the President's approval of the following reconmen- dations by the Secretary of Defense presented at the meet- ing: a. b. That the THOR and JUPITER development programs be combined into a single missile progran. That a committee composed of one member each from the Departments of Defense, the Air Force and the Amy, 7 ae 7, | REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT. D - BESEWHOWER LIBRARY - consider both the THOR and JUPITER programs and, after evaluating the engineering and scientific information available to date, recommend such final single missile program, be under the management of the Air Force; with a report thereon by the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Council not later than October 1, 1957. ¢. Meanwhile, as to the THOR and JUPITER programs: (1) Suspend or cancel the production of additional missiles and missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program; and - 16 - re |pTOP SECT