TOP SECRE!

Secretary Wilson read a memorandum addressed to the Prest-

dent under date of July 31, 1957 (copy filed in the minutes of the
meeting), as follows:

"The present dual approach to the IRBM develoment progran
with its resultant excessive cost is no longer justified. I
recommend that the THOR and JUPIEER development programs be
combined into a single missile program.
"I propose to establish a committee composed of three menbers, one each from the Department of Defense, the Air Force
and the Army to consider both the JUPITER and THOR prograns with
the purpose of properly eveluating the engineering and scientific information provided by the work to date. This committee will
be asked to recommend a final program which, when adopted, will
be under the management of the Air Force. The advisability of a
new name for the program will be considered at that time.

"I propose in the meantime to suspend or cancel the produc-

tion of additional missiles and missile components beyond those
necessary for a continuing test program. [ further propose that
overtime be eliminated except that necessary in conjunction with
flight testing and for the small amount necessary to take care
of emergencies. This applies to both contractors’ operations as
well as those under our supervision.

"T conceive the new program as costing substantially less

than the present dual approach.

“These changes may cause some delay in the program.

While

this cannot be definitely evalnated at this time, I believe it
will not be great enough to be important in the light of the

time it will take to work out operational use and deployment

of the perfected missile.

“ig.
=_t
5.

REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT, D. EISEWHOWER LIBRARY *

"In respect to the ICBM programs, I propose to continue the
ATLAS at the highest priority. We are re-examining the facilities and schedules for experimental production, including a careful study of the overtime problem, to see if acceptable economies
can be made.
"In respect to the TITAN program, I believe that by redncing the pressures on this program we can make substantial economies in this alternative development.

"I would like to make it clear that the actions we are

proposing at this time might be considered to depart fram the
directions that we received as a result of National Security

Council Action 1433 on & September 1955 under which we wre

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