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(Ann Whitman file

8.

PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL MORATORIUM ON FUTURE TESTS 0}
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, datad

May 17, 25 and 26, 1954; NSC Action No. 1106-h; NSC 112)

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that the Secretary off State,
as chairman of a committee, would report on the question of Unjted
States agreement to a moratorium on further tests of nuclear waapons.
He pointed out that the Council had before it three reporte on [the
subject; one from the Department of Defense opposing U. S. agrd@eneant

to the moratorium, one from CIA, and one from the Federal Ci

De-

fense Administration. No written report had come from the Department
_of State, but Secretary Dulles had some remarks to make on the [subject.
Secretary Dulles said that he and his committee had t
Studying this problem intensively over the last two weeks. He fhad
talked as recently as yesterdsy with Admiral Strauss, and as afresult of these conversations, three or four significant questions had
been posed. The subject needed further study vefore the camnititee
could present its reconmmendaticns to the Netional Security Cowkil.
One of the problems which had particularly concerned him, said Becre-

tary Dulles, is how the United States could secure the propagaria ad-

vantage it sought from accepting a moratorium without at the same time
setting the lower limit to the moratoriut ai wespons of 100 KT f Vela.
He eald that hitherto we had assumed that we would continue to fe free

to testweepons of this or lower yleld, Sut if we propose the 30 KT
as the lower limit, the Soviets might well come back with a prapesel
to ban tests of all weapons yielding more than 50 KT. In the process

of bargaining they might even try to get an absolute ban, since there
was no clear criterion which we could invoke. Accordingly,
4 more
he studied the problem the more clearly he perceived that the qromganda tell might well be stolen from the U. S. by the USSR.

The second important question stemmed from the fact that we

do not have very accurate methods of measuring the size of nuclear ex. Plosions in the Seviet Union. This would make it extremely difficult
to police a,moratorium and to assure ourselves that the Soviets were not evading their commitments. Nevertheless, the proposal for fb noratorium was now before the UN, and while we have asked that the bubject
be deferred, we will presently have to decide whether to réject] this
proposal flatly or to offer same sort of counter-proposal. Secretary
Dulles concluded his statement with a promise to mit the varying opinious together and to present a comprehensive report at next veek's
Council meeting.

Turning to Admiral Strauss, the President inquired ag to
the degree ofaccuracy on the size of Soviet explosions which the AEC
obtained after it had put together all the results of its invesbigs- tiong. Admiral Strauss replied that there was always a consid: able |
difference of opinion and of debate after the Russians had tested one

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