(1) It is realized that the main mission is now anti-air force, e.g.
destruction of aircraft on the ground, and not industrial destruction,
All else is secondary.
(2) There is great interést in large weapons,
The problem of the
destruction of air fields is of enormous urgency.
cratering is required.
Large scale
Even empty air fields would be bombed,
(3) The weapons which now exist can essentdally fulfil their needs,
The carriers leave much to be desired.
.
—
(4) They are very interested in contact fuzing, and unhappy that this
is not receiving more attention,
(5) Ballistic missiles may become very important, but theywill not
supplant aircraft.
needed,
At least one more heavy plane past the B~52 is:
Nuclear propulsion is very much desired; it ia considered
more important than bomb development,
(6) The dispersion ideal would be about five planes on an air field,
Considerable dispersion may be expected in the next 2-3 years.
(7) Speed may not be decisive in a heavy plane.
High altitude may be
more important.
There was a lengthy discussion on the proper attitude for the GAC
to take with respect to nuclear aircraft develcpment and its organize~
tional arrangements.
Most of the members were prepared to endorse the
great urgency of this development, Mr. Murphree, Dr, Rabi, and Dr, von
Neumann were particularly inclined to this view.
Mr. Whitman, on the
other hand, tended to take a more cautious position.
He said he was in
favor of a nuclear powered plane but was not convinced it should have
first priority.