~ ire oa » w @ ® HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN Washington 25, D. C. 10 November 1953 Annex L to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53 COMMUNICATIONS 1. General Remarks a. The objectives of the basic plan are to: (1) Conduct tests, commencing in January 1954, of weapons and experimental devices in the ENIWETOK-BIKINI area to include technical and measurement programs proposed by the AEC and DOD, : (2) To provide for the security of the joint-task force plus ba, ~ Sob. . Sy at . pice te . 4 adhe eee OleLahs orhersdale) einai it > e ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS. be . is annex establishes the policies and general plans for the tet we Sadho tet a g's Hurthd yaad Sac aialutWASaltersSei aA, & ade Be Os Wee installation, maintenance and operation of commnication-electronic - facilities of Joint Task Force SEVEN, Further information concern“ing communication-electroniec facilities of task groups will be found in the operation orders of the task groups. 9. Statement of the Situation. On 21 May 1952, the JCS designated the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army as Executive Agent for an overseas atomic test operation (Operation CASTLE) and assigned the mission of the execution of CASTLE to the Commander, Joint Task Force 132. Onl February 1953, JIF 132 was administratively redesignated as Joint Task Force SEVEN (JTF SEVEN) with no change in the previously assign~ ed mission of conducting Operation CASTLE, a. Enemy Situation, The Soviet Union has the following capabili- ties which may affect the accomplishment of our communication electronic mission. (1) Monitoring |or “Intercept. All low, medium and high frequency . radio circuits are subject to constant intercept from fixed land ‘positions or possibly from ships, aircraft.or submarines. In the same manner and under favorable atmospheric conditions, VHF transmissions also are susceptible to active Soviet monitoring. (2) Jamming. Although it is not expected that the Soviets will take aggressive action to interfere with task force communicationelectronic operations, they have demonstrated their capabilities in HF jamming. There also are indications that they are prepared to jam in the VHF/UHF bands. Aaeke an (3) Other Interference. In addition, it is considered that interference with the commnication-électronic mission or compromise of its activities could be affected by espionage, sabotage, overt action by vessel or aircraft, raids, observations, unauthorized instrumentation and declaration of war. b. Friendly Situation. The following activities, outside the task ~ force, will furnish communication-electronic support as indicated. i (1) National Security Agency (NSA) - will provide experimental AFSAY 804 (x) ciphony equipment for the USS ESTES firing party cir- cuit.