CEH have the prerogative of solocting those Service laboratories in which it desires to have such work accomplished, This procedure should be accomplished with the understanding that where some suggested assignment of workloed inter‘ feres with high priority projects within that particular laboratory, the ; Departmont of Defense rctains the prerogative to suggest another Service + laboratory which the AEC oan use for its purpose. hen the AEC requests “ assistance on major projects, such as the development of special purpose weapons and major components, tho Department of Defense should retain the @rreetive of selecting which Service shall have this devolopment responsibility. 20. Military Initiative in Weapon Devolopment - It is evident that the military can contribute to the atomic weapon program not only by increased collaboration with the AEC, but by inittating rescarch and development into . * new weapons systems and thc weapons associated with them. It is pointed out . 9. O| that to date only two special purposo weapons exclusive of guided missiles and rockets have evolved from the initiativo of the Departmant of Defense. In both of these cases tho major responsibilitics for developing these |e ate eeeeg 3 ee cee L ) “oN ( . ) ; : “she AZC. 21. Cc — aa werg delogatod to the Serivces under the ultimate responsibility of . ~ Legal Aspocts ~- It is the opinion of the Group that the existing ier \ _— laws and arrangements authorize the Department of Defense to conduct rescarch |, : and dovelopment on non-nuclear components and assenblics, irrespective of ' their configuration as bombs, rockets, guided missiles, drones or special purpose weapons. ‘ ( A joint legal validation of this opinion would be an important step in maximizing the over-all effort. There is nothing in the presont arrangoments or law that prevents or discourages in any way Department of | \ Defense studies and development on non-nuclear portions of atomic weapons for application to tho various requirements of the Department of Defense. It is the belief of this Group that the rcluctance of the Services to explere now atomic weapons and thoir applications has been duo in part to a rostricted interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act, which states in Section 6, subsection (bd) that, "It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, produce, transfor, or acquire any equipment or device utilizing SAee PUCRSY ACT OF 1846 - comenibot GANDA RC we