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He also predicted that his proposed revisions would have the support
of more than two-thirds of the members of the United States Senate,
as well as the backing of most of the leading American scientists.
Furthertiore, he believed that his proposed revisions were largely in
accord with the views of General Norstad, even though these proposed
revisions had not been wholly agreed upon in the NATO Council.
In essence, Governor Stassen said that his three specific
recommendations for revision of the August 1957 proposals were designed to move forward certain parts of the agreed U. S. position
as of August 1957. He said he believed that these recommendations
offered a very good chance of initiating an inspection system within
the Soviet Union, and were in the interest of the United States as
well as of the Free World generally. Governor Stassen also felt
that the USSR itself would find in these recommendations an element
which corresponded to their own interest in preventing global
nuclear war. At any rate, these were the premises on which Governor Stassen had proceeded in drawing up his recommended revisions,
and he warned that the United States would lose the support of
world public opinion if we took a negative attitude with respect
to any change in the August 1957 position.
Thereafter Governor Stassen dealt briefly with his first
recommendation for a revision--namely, for the installation of some
eight to twelve test monitoring inspection stations in the USSR and
& like number in the United States. On a map he indicated the sites
within the Soviet Union at which these test monitoring inspection
stations would be located. He pointed out that the choice of sites
for these stations in the Soviet Union had been selected on the
basis of the opinion of experts in the Department of Defense. He
went on to point out that following satisfactory agreement on the
inspection stations and on prompt installation of the inspection
system, his proposal recommended a 2h-month suspension of nuclear
testing. He added that he felt that in making this suggestion he
was in line with a statement made by the President in June 1957,
and he also admitted that there were possibilities of evasion of
the test suspension by the USSR, although he thought that successful evasions were not likely.
Governor Stassen then turned to his second recommendation,
which he pointed out could be put forward separately or in combination with his first recommendation. Again using a map, he indicated
that his second recommendation called for the establishment of an
initial inspection zone against surprise attack in the Western USSR
and Central Europe. This zone would be from approximately 3° East
longitude to 28° East longitude, and from 45 North latitude to the
Arctic Circle zone. In describing this inspection zone, Governor
Stassen pointed out that it covered a larger territory than General
Norstad had described as the essential minimm. It also fitted in
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