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Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that we should, of
course, not be rigid in our views on disarmament and, indeed, we had
not been rigid. But to change our position on disarmament at the
present- time, in ways that would threaten the strength of the allience and which would be interpreted as a great Soviet victory, was
an error. He did not think this was the time to teke such an action
and, furthermore, such an action would be incompatible with our
basic policy. Indeed, Secretary Dulles said he did not think that
he would be able to maintain a belief in the posture of U. &. strength
and confidence if these proposals were adopted. Our allies are invarjJably fearful of bilateral negotiations between the United States and
the USSR,
Beyond all these considerations, Secretary Dulles also enm-
phesized the fact that we are now coming face to face with the problems of outer space. We should now strive to do our level best to
see that outer space was used for peaceful purposes only. Much of
our energy should be directed to this kind of study.
To repeat, said Secretary Dulles, he did not believe it
was desirable for the United States to take too rigid a position in
the matter of disarmament agreements. He was perfectly willing to
take some chances. We couid never be one hundred percent sure. Indeed, he might be willing to support Governor Stassen's proposals if
they were looked at only under technical end military aspects, but
not if looked at on the political and foreign policy side. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles recommended that the United States for the
time being stand firm on the August 1957 preposals. We must not
panic. We must not give in to the Soviets under present conditions.
After all, it took two years of negotiation with the Soviets to
achieve the armistice in Korea, and an even longer time to achieve
the treaty on Austria. In both instances, however, the Soviets had
finally come round to our point of view, and in this connection our
disarmament proposal was only four months old. Secretary Dulles repeated that he didn't claim that we shouldn't change our August 1957
proposals; but he did insist that we shouldn't do it now, and especdally we shouldn't do it until the requisite changes in the atomic
energy legislation had been assured.
Mr. Brundage expressed his view of the desirability of some
kind of middle ground. He felt that some kind of U. S. initiative
would be very helpful, and believed that we should not stand pat on
the August 1957 position.
cil.
The President said he had some questions to put to the Coun-
First of all, we mst remember that we do not know what the Con-
gress will do on our recommendations for changes in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.
‘the President believed thet we could contemplate the
at r
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break-up of NATO if we ceased nuclear testing in agreement with the
USSR before the terms of this Act had been changed.
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