TOP SECRET
Lice deawed’ bbetAt the conclusion of Dr. Killian's statement, Mr. Cutler
called on Secretary Quarles, who pointed out initially that the
recommendations of the Department of Defense for stepping up our
defenses went only pert way to meet the recommendations of the
Gaither Panel. If one were to measure the matter in dollars, perhaps the Defense expenditures would amount to one-half the amount
called for by the Gaither Panel recommendations. On the other hand,
the Defense Department believed that it had picked out for acceleration the most essential areas of defense described in the Gaither
Panel recommendations.
Secretary Quarles then indicated that he would comment
briefly on a few of the key recommendations of the Geither Panel in
terms of what Defense was doing about them. His first reference was
to the third Panel recommendation, viz.:
"Accelerate the initial op-
erational capability of the Polaris submarine ICHM system, and in-
crease the submarine force from six to 18."
With respect to this
recommendation, Secretary Quarles stated that the Department of the
Navy was now working on a proposal which would involve the construction of nine submarines capable of carrying Poleris missiles, rather
than the three hitherto contemplated in Defense Department plans.
Furthermore, the Navy plan would accelerate the completion dates
for these missile-bearing submarines. But, said Secretary Quarles,
this Navy Department plan was not yet firm, and if the Navy Depertment plan were actually adopted, sums well beyond those currently
available to the Department of Defense would be required. Secretary Quarles also predicted very strong Congressional support for
the construction of perhaps as many as 100 of such submarines.
Secretary Quarles next turned to recommendation 11 of
the Gaither Panel:
“Improve and ensure tactical warning against
aircraft, including radar modernization and lengthening of seaward
extensions."
Secretary Quarles pointed out that the tactical warn-
ing network constituted one of the most difficult areas of judgment
facing the Department of Defense. To strive for perfection in a
warning network would involve costs going far beyond anything that
the Defense Department had hitherto thought wise to put inte our
continental defense. The currently-proposed program admittedly
fell far short of the ideal warning system. Similarly, with respect to recommendation 13, to “develop early warning redar system;
meanwhile using interim crash program", Secretary Quarles explained
that tremendous expenses would be involved in carrying out this rece
ommendation of the Gaither Panel.
Secretary Quarles referred thereafter to recommendation 17:
"Increase initial operational capability of ICBMs from 80 to 600."
In point of fact, the Defense Department was planning to produce 130
ICEMs by the end of FY 1963.
Secretary Quarles then explained the
nature of the problem involved in meeting the Panel's recommendation
for 600 ICEMs by the end of FY 1963.
He indicated that we had the
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