Under the background discussion is first noted that the possibility of an
pgen-sea shot has been in the minds of the testing people for some years because
f the flexibility of time and place of operation that it allows and the following
nteresting statement is made:
“Immediately following HARDTACK I, prior to the test:
oritorium, a crash program was planned to implement an open-sea test of a weapon
ssential to the stockpile.
Because of the stability it offered, a large concrete
il barge, excess to the needs of the EPG, was planned for use as the zero site.
3 would have been towed &o an area two hundred miles north of Eniwetok for a
atonation where fall-out weather delays would have been minimized.
songi was rejected beaause of fall-out on the Marshallese.
Use of
j
This plan to resume
esting in the a was rejected by Secretary Dulles and to date 5 oven-sea
urface testing bawe ever been conducted."
The prexsuxex political pressures
xisting from the UN are noted since they “may prevent any further use of" EPG
nd the January 59 selection of the area three hyndred miles sduth of Hilo by
LOO is noted.
This is documented in the minutes of the ALOO conference. of
8-29 January 59, forwarded to Starbird from Burtford on 6 February 59 by
. letter # TE:
MPS:
3199.
Several pages address in some detail the concept
f the operation including the tine vithin the owgrall five month time frame
°
hat the various movements and activities would take place, the locations of
-ertain activities such as preparation of the LCU shot platform, and the deteils
f actually executing the shot and performing the diagnostics are noted.
This
is followed by several pages of the specific ectivities and problem areas that
J-3 will face in the various phases of build-up and execution.
tontains an estimate of the resources required which include:
The final section
Seven to to eight
ships of six different types; fifteen to twenty aircraft of seven or eight different
types; minimum
dawaili.
comminications; and a brief description of the basefacilities on
K